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ARTICLES 
RIDING THE WAVE OR DROWNING?:  
AN ANALYSIS OF GENDER BIAS 
AND TWOMBLY/IQBAL IN TITLE IX 
ACCUSED STUDENT LAWSUITS 
 
Bethany A. Corbin* 
 
In April 2011, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights shook 
the foundation of campus sexual assault policies by publishing a “Dear 
Colleague” letter (“the 2011 DCL”).  The 2011 DCL emphasized that a 
university’s failure to address sexual assault constituted gender 
discrimination in violation of Title IX and further clarified a university’s role 
in preventing, responding to, and correcting sexual abuse.  This letter 
symbolized the Obama administration’s commitment to—and aggressive 
enforcement of—Title IX.  Universities reacted by rebuilding and 
strengthening their administrative responses to sexual assault in a decidedly 
provictim manner.  Unfortunately, these alterations to the campus 
disciplinary structure sacrificed accused sexual assault perpetrators’ rights 
to fairness and due process.  To remedy perceived errors in disciplinary 
proceedings, accused assailants are increasingly suing their universities for 
reverse gender discrimination under Title IX.  Alleged perpetrators argue 
that men are invariably found responsible for sexual misconduct due to a 
politicized sexual assault climate. 
This Article offers the first empirical analysis of dismissal trends in reverse 
Title IX cases and highlights that most courts erroneously dismiss these 
lawsuits at the 12(b)(6) stage.  Through a misinterpretation of plausibility 
pleading, these courts hold that accused perpetrators have not shown causal 
evidence of discrimination at the outset of the lawsuit.  This prodismissal 
approach, however, violates Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.’s proclamation 
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Boult Cummings LLP (2014–2016); J.D., 2013, Wake Forest University School of Law; B.A., 
2011, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  The author wishes to thank Professors 
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Schools conference.  The author is also grateful to Professors Jonathan Cardi and Zoe Niesel 
for their continued support and encouragement.  Finally, the author appreciates the dedication 
and assistance of the Fordham Law Review team for editing and publishing this Article. 
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that a plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination in the 
complaint.  This Article proposes a more flexible causal pleading scheme that 
satisfies Twombly, Iqbal, and Swierkiewicz and ensures accused 
perpetrators receive their day in court.  Alternatively, this Article argues for 
limited predismissal discovery in reverse Title IX suits where the court 
contends the causational element has been insufficiently pled. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The evening of October 11, 2014, started with a party.  When John, a 
Brown University sophomore, encountered Jane at the lively event, the two 
left for what John termed “a consensual hook up.”1  Jane called it sexual 
assault.2  Approximately one week later, Jane made a “serious allegation of 
sexual misconduct” to university officials, and the university issued a no-
contact order against John.3  John received written notice on November 5, 
2014, that the university had formally charged him with four student code 
violations.4  Although John provided Brown with a list of witnesses, Brown 
did not contact any of these individuals prior to initiating the charges.5 
Four days before the student conduct hearing, Brown gave John access to 
an eighty-page packet of “critical evidence and procedural information.”6  
The packet did not include favorable character statements of John.  Brown 
further appointed Richard Bova, senior associate dean of residential and 
dining services, as a substitute member of the panel the day before the 
hearing.7  This last-minute substitution deprived John of an opportunity to 
screen the new panelist for conflicts of interest.8  Such screening would have 
revealed that Bova was previously accused in a federal lawsuit of violating a 
Brown student’s rights in a sexual misconduct investigation.9 
During the disciplinary hearing, the panelists refused to cross-examine 
Jane about the multiple inconsistencies in her interviews, complaint, and 
subsequent retellings of the events.10  Additionally, the disciplinary panel 
stopped John’s testimony only a few seconds into his midpoint statement.11  
 
 1. See Complaint paras. 11–12, Doe v. Brown Univ., No. 1:15-cv-00144 (D.R.I. Apr. 13, 
2015), ECF No. 1.  In the complaint and subsequent court documents, the male perpetrator is 
known only as John Doe, and the female victim is known as Jane Doe. See id.  For purposes 
of this Article and to enhance readability, the male student is referred to as “John,” and the 
female student is referred to as “Jane.” 
 2. See id. paras. 20, 23, 30.  The events in the introduction are relayed from John’s 
perspective for two reasons:  First, records from campus sexual assault proceedings are not 
publicly available.  Consequently, the retelling of events is limited to John’s federal complaint.  
Second, this Article focuses on the denial of due process to alleged campus sexual assault 
perpetrators.  Thus, understanding the disciplinary process from the accused’s perspective is 
critical to this piece.  This Article in no way attempts to victim blame or minimize the harm 
sexual violence victims suffer.  The author herself is a former victim of domestic violence and 
understands the emotional sensitivity that accompanies this topic. 
 3. See id. paras. 15, 20–21, 23. 
 4. See id. para. 41.  Brown charged John with the following offenses:  (1) “[a]ctions that 
result in or can be reasonably expected to result in physical harm to a person or persons”; (2) 
“[s]exual Misconduct that involves non-consensual physical contact of a sexual nature”; (3) 
“[s]exual Misconduct that includes one or more of the following:  penetration, violent physical 
force, or injury”; and (4) “[i]llegal possession or use of alcohol.” Id. para. 30. 
 5. See id. paras. 39, 44. 
 6. Id. para. 49.  Brown’s “Code of Conduct” requires that respondents have seven 
business days to access and review all materials that will be presented and considered at the 
disciplinary hearing. See id. 
 7. See id. para. 62. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. paras. 69–73. 
 11. See id. para. 74. 
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In contrast to the panel’s twenty minutes of calmly cross-examining Jane, 
John endured ninety minutes of cross-examination in a “caustic tone.”12  The 
panel further failed to investigate the motives and biases of Jane’s 
witnesses.13  Unsurprisingly, the panel found John “responsible” for all four 
charges and suspended him for two and a half years.14 
In the aftermath of his suspension, John filed a federal lawsuit with the 
District of Rhode Island on April 13, 2015.15  The gravamen of John’s 
complaint was a reverse Title IX claim for erroneous outcome and deliberate 
indifference.16  Specifically, John argued that his suspension was 
“symptomatic of a broader culture of inherent, systematic and intentional 
gender bias against male students accused of sexual misconduct.”17  In 
particular, John alleged that Brown’s policies exhibited gender bias because 
male perpetrators accused of sexual assault are “invariably found guilty.”18  
As a result of this bias, John argued that male students are denied fair and 
impartial procedures during the disciplinary process.19 
For many suspected perpetrators of campus sexual assault, John’s 
experience is exceedingly common.  In 2011, the Department of Education’s 
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) issued a “Dear Colleague” letter (“the 2011 
DCL”) to universities explaining that Title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972 prohibits sexual assault as a form of sexual harassment.20  The 2011 
DCL clarified the Department of Education’s interpretation of Title IX, 
addressing such topics as proper notice and appeal procedures, use of a 
preponderance of the evidence standard, and development of interim 
protection for sexual assault victims.21  The 2011 DCL reiterated that a 
university’s failure to comply with these procedures could result in a Title IX 
investigation and loss of federal funding.22  OCR’s “guidance” and its 
corresponding ramifications have pressured universities to crack down on 
sexual assault and prosecute those crimes zealously through the disciplinary 
system.23  While this outcome received widespread praise for destigmatizing 
 
 12. See id. paras. 68, 76. 
 13. See id. paras. 77–79. 
 14. Id. para. 82. 
 15. See id. paras. 1, 47. 
 16. See id. paras. 94–101, 106–146. 
 17. Id. para. 120. 
 18. Id. para. 127. 
 19. See id. para. 94. 
 20. See Letter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER 
1, 3 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 DCL], http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/ 
colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNR9-R5G6]; see also Max Kutner, The Other Side 
of the College Sexual Assault Crisis, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 10, 2015, 5:33 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/2015/12/18/other-side-sexual-assault-crisis-403285.html [https:// 
perma.cc/J3RE-SPRC]. 
 21. See 2011 DCL, supra note 20, at 4–16. 
 22. See id. at 16. 
 23. See Valerie Bauerlein, In Campus Rape Tribunals, Some Men See Injustice, WALL ST. 
J. (Apr. 10, 2015, 12:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-campus-rape-tribunals-some-
men-see-injustice-1428684187 (stating that the 2011 DCL is a federal directive that instructs 
campuses to “crack down on sexual assault”) [https://perma.cc/2SLW-WW8D]; Scott Jaschik, 
Swarthmore Backs Down, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/ 
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sexual violence, hundreds of accused perpetrators are arguing that higher 
education sexual assault procedures “trample” on their federal rights.24  
These students cite myriad ways in which universities favor victims of sexual 
assault throughout the disciplinary process, to the point of impeding justice.25  
By perceiving male rights as subordinate to OCR’s policy agenda, 
universities may inadvertently deny sexual assault perpetrators due process 
and fairness. 
The perceived lack of justice in university disciplinary proceedings has 
prompted many accused assailants to seek vindication of their rights in the 
judicial system.26  Hundreds of males accused of sexual violence are suing 
their universities for gender discrimination.27  These students are unwilling 
to accept the perceived denial of their civil rights and destruction of their 
academic future based on an allegedly biased system.28  Filing suit under 
Title IX is a political declaration that male rights matter and a final chance to 
reverse disciplinary sanctions. 
Regrettably, when universities shut the doors of justice, the judiciary 
seems to bolt the lock.  Through a misinterpretation of plausibility pleading, 
a majority of district courts improperly dismiss reverse Title IX cases and 
block the final avenue of relief for accused students.29  These courts read Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly30 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal31 as requiring 
particularized factual evidence that the flawed disciplinary proceeding was a 
direct result of the student’s gender.32  Rather than evaluating the complaint 
as a whole, these courts mandate specific factual data on the causal element 
 
news/2014/12/01/swarthmore-drops-findings-against-male-student-who-sued-under-title-ix 
(explaining that universities face “intense pressure from female students and the U.S. 
Education Department to crack down on sexual assault”) [https://perma.cc/E935-25DY]. 
 24. Kutner, supra note 20; see also Lavinia M. Weizel, The Process That Is Due:  
Preponderance of the Evidence as the Standard of Proof for University Adjudications of 
Student-on-Student Sexual Assault Complaints, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1618 (2012) (“In 
response to the Dear Colleague Letter, critics have argued that the use of the preponderance 
of the evidence standard in school disciplinary proceedings may jeopardize or even violate the 
due process rights of accused students.”). 
 25. See infra Part II. 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See Colleges Slammed with Lawsuits from Men Accused of Sex Crimes, CBS NEWS 
(Mar. 23, 2016, 2:51 PM) [hereinafter Colleges Slammed], http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ 
colleges-slammed-with-lawsuits-from-men-accused-of-sex-crimes/ (noting that prominent 
attorney Andrew Miltenberg represents almost one hundred accused perpetrators of sexual 
assault) [https://perma.cc/7GSL-7WW5]; Teresa Watanabe, More College Men Are Fighting 
Back Against Sexual Misconduct Cases, L.A. TIMES (June 7, 2014, 6:15 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-sexual-assault-legal-20140608-story.html (claiming that 
Andrew Miltenberg receives approximately three to four new sexual assault cases each week) 
[https://perma.cc/M8DZ-D56K]. 
 28. See Max Kutner, Suspended College Athlete Suing U.S. over Sexual Assault 
‘Guidance,’ NEWSWEEK (Apr. 20, 2016, 1:52 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/grant-neal-
lawsuit-sexual-assault-pueblo-450334 [perma.cc/C37H-SNLQ]. 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 31. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 32. See infra note 239 and accompanying text. 
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at the outset of the lawsuit.33  This framework creates an insurmountable 
pleading hurdle that plaintiffs cannot overcome.34 
While the majority’s approach to dismissal may be appropriate if Twombly 
and Iqbal existed in isolation, courts improperly ignore the third leg of the 
stool:  Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.35  Swierkiewicz, which was cited 
favorably in Twombly,36 expressly holds that the elements of a prima facie 
case are evidentiary in nature and “should not be transposed into a rigid 
pleading” structure.37  Rather, discrimination claims should be judged only 
based on the plausibility of the complaint in its entirety.  Because the causal 
link between discriminatory conduct and gender bias is part of the prima facie 
framework, the complaint does not need evidentiary backing or extensive 
factual allegations at the pleading stage.38 
This Article analyzes the inability of accused students to access justice 
through both educational disciplinary proceedings and courts of law.39  In 
particular, this Article proposes a more flexible reverse Title IX pleading 
scheme in line with Twombly, Iqbal, and Swierkiewicz and advocates for 
limited discovery where a court determines that a plaintiff’s complaint lacks 
factual specificity for the causation element. 
To explore these issues, this Article is divided into four parts.  Part I offers 
an overview of campus sexual assault, Title IX, and OCR’s interpretive 
guidance, focusing particularly on the 2011 DCL.  Part I then highlights a 
university’s investigatory and adjudicatory roles in sexual assault 
disciplinary proceedings, details the most common due process violations, 
and offers an explanation for why these breaches of due process occur.  Part 
II describes accused students’ use of reverse Title IX lawsuits to protest this 
deprivation of rights.  Then, Part III builds on this foundation and delves into 
an analysis of the current pleading standards by examining the parameters of 
Twombly, Iqbal, and Swierkiewicz.  Part III also explores how plausibility 
pleading has altered the motion to dismiss landscape for reverse sex 
discrimination claims and investigates the majority and minority approaches 
to reverse Title IX complaints.  Additionally, Part III provides the first 
empirical analysis of dismissal trends in reverse Title IX cases.  Finally, Part 
 
 33. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 34. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 35. 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
 36. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007); see also Serrano v. 
Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 897 (6th Cir. 2012); Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 609 
(6th Cir. 2012). 
 37. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510–12. 
 38. See Witte v. Rippe & Kingston Sys., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 658, 666 (S.D. Ohio 2005) 
(holding that a plaintiff is not required to plead evidence of direct or indirect causation); see 
also Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[E]vidence is not 
required at the pleading stage.”); Hodczak v. Latrobe Specialty Steel Co., No. 08-649, 2009 
WL 911311, at *6 n.7 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2009) (affirming the validity of Witte post-
Twombly). 
 39. The author does not express an opinion on whether discrimination is the proper lens 
through which to view sexual assault and reverse Title IX claims.  In fact, the author believes 
that such claims may be better suited to a vulnerability analysis.  However, given the present 
classification of sexual assault as discrimination, this Article uses this current lens to examine 
reverse Title IX claims. 
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IV argues that the majority’s dismissal of reverse Title IX lawsuits 
contravenes Swierkiewicz and proposes a more flexible pleading approach 
for the causation element.  This relaxed pleading framework not only satisfies 
the plausibility requirement but also prevents accused perpetrators from 
having to establish the evidentiary value of their claims at the outset of the 
lawsuit. 
I.  TITLE IX AND THE VIOLATION OF STUDENT RIGHTS 
Public attention, controversy, and criticism regarding campus sexual 
assault has reached an unprecedented level.40  Many universities, perceived 
as fostering a culture of rape, endure repeated attacks by politicians, federal 
regulatory agencies, and the press regarding their insufficient responses to 
sexual violence.41  This part explains the role of Title IX in bolstering 
educational institutions’ reactions to sexual violence and highlights the 
manner in which the disciplinary process can violate the rights of accused 
perpetrators. 
A.  Understanding Campus Sexual Assault 
Sexual assault is a complicated and pervasive problem facing higher 
education institutions today.  Harrowingly common, sexual violence 
disproportionately affects college women, particularly freshman and 
sophomore students.42  Recent studies estimate that at least one in five 
women is sexually assaulted in college,43 with a vast majority of incidents 
 
 40. See, e.g., Diane L. Rosenfeld, Uncomfortable Conversations:  Confronting the Reality 
of Target Rape on Campus, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 359, 359 (2015) (“Th[e] longstanding 
epidemic of campus sexual assault has finally reached a flashpoint, igniting a national 
dialogue.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Nicole Auerbach, Summary of Outside Report:  Baylor Failed Sexual Assault 
Victims, USA TODAY (May 27, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/big12/ 
2016/05/26/baylor-investigation-pepper-hamilton-report-sexual-assault/84979090/ [https:// 
perma.cc/LU6U-ZELG]; Elena Kadvany, Stanford University Processes Fail Victims 
of Sexual Assault, Students Say, PALO ALTO ONLINE (Jan. 22, 2016), http:// 
www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2016/01/22/stanford-university-processes-fail-victims-of-
sexual-assault-students-say [https://perma.cc/2LFR-CQXJ]; THE HUNTING GROUND (Radius-
TWC 2015) (exposing the failure of universities to expel or suspend perpetrators responsible 
for sexual misconduct). 
 42. See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT, NOT 
ALONE 2, 6 (2014) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/ 
ovw/page/file/905942/download [https://perma.cc/7UBY-F9D2]; see also Susan Hanley 
Duncan, The Devil Is in the Details:  Will the Campus SaVE Act Provide More or Less 
Protection to Victims of Campus Assaults?, 40 J.C. & U.L. 443, 445 (2014); Karen Oehme et 
al., A Deficiency in Addressing Campus Sexual Assault:  The Lack of Women Law Enforcement 
Officers, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 337, 352 (2015); Weizel, supra note 24, at 1614. 
 43. See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON WOMEN & GIRLS, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT:  A 
RENEWED CALL TO ACTION 10 (2014) [hereinafter COUNCIL ON WOMEN & GIRLS REPORT], 
http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/research/201401_WhiteHouse_CouncilonWomenandGirls_
RapeandSexualAssault.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8LK-4P29]; Rosenfeld, supra note 40, at 359.  
Although the one-in-five statistic has been verified by numerous scholars, disagreement 
nonetheless exists regarding the prevalence of campus sexual assault.  For instance, columnist 
Edward Morrissey insists that the pressure colleges face to address campus sexual assault 
“comes in part from a moral panic based on bad data.” Edward Morrissey, Opinion, Guilt by 
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occurring before the victim turns twenty-four.44  Contrary to public 
perception, the majority of sexual assault victims (between 75 percent and 80 
percent) know their attacker, either as a current or former romantic partner or 
acquaintance.45  This bond between victim and perpetrator forces victims to 
confront not only the painful aftermath of a sexual attack but also intense 
feelings of betrayal and mistrust.46 
The commonness of sexual violence at universities nationwide suggests 
the existence of particularized environmental and cultural triggers on 
campuses that perpetuate sexual misconduct.  According to former Homeland 
Security Secretary and current university administrator Janet Napolitano, the 
fact that “vast numbers of young adults live independently and in close 
proximity to one another for the first time” is a key factor in the prevalence 
of sexual violence at universities.47  Additionally, easy and constant access 
to alcohol combined with a “party” and casual “hook-up”48 environment 
exacerbate the frequency of sexual assault.49  Research reveals that most 
campus sexual assaults involve intoxication, occur late at night, and do not 
result in outward physical injuries.50  In one study, 80 percent of assailants 
 
Accusation—How Colleges Deal with Campus Sex, FISCAL TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2014/08/14/Guilt-Accusation-How-Colleges-Deal-
Campus-Sex [https://perma.cc/A4BP-U2HK].  Morrissey expresses concern that the one-in-
five statistic comes solely from a study consisting of an online questionnaire conducted at two 
universities, not a formal, widespread study conducted pursuant to academic standards. Id. 
 44. See COUNCIL ON WOMEN & GIRLS REPORT, supra note 43, at 10; Duncan, supra note 
42, at 445. 
 45. See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 6; Duncan, supra note 42, 
at 445 (placing the percentage of women who knew their sexual assault attackers at 90 
percent). 
 46. See COUNCIL ON WOMEN & GIRLS REPORT, supra note 43, at 7. 
 47. Janet Napolitano, “Only Yes Means Yes”:  An Essay on University Policies Regarding 
Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 387 (2015). 
 48. The frequency of “hook-ups” on college campuses has been widely documented by 
the media. See Kate Dwyer, The Surprising Reality About Hook-Up Culture in College, TEEN 
VOGUE (Dec. 9, 2015, 11:34 AM), http://www.teenvogue.com/story/hookup-culture-myth-
dating-college [https://perma.cc/QN5C-FZYV].  The definition of a “hook-up,” however, is 
purposefully vague, and can involve sexual activity that ranges from kissing to intercourse 
without the expectation of a continued romantic relationship. See id.  Whether a “hook-up” 
culture actually exists on college campuses or is merely a myth is the subject of constant 
debate. Compare DONNA FREITAS, THE END OF SEX:  HOW HOOKUP CULTURE IS LEAVING A 
GENERATION UNHAPPY, SEXUALLY UNFULFILLED, AND CONFUSED ABOUT INTIMACY (2013) 
(arguing that the “hook-up” culture dominates the lives of college students), with Justin J. 
Lehmiller, The Myth of College “Hookup Culture,” BOSTON.COM (July 16, 2014), 
http://www.boston.com/culture/relationships/2014/07/16/the-myth-of-college-hookup-
culture (noting that college “students today [do] not report having sex more often” or having 
a greater number of sexual partners than college students in the 1980s and 1990s) 
[https://perma.cc/U6V9-5DG7]. 
 49. See Sarah Edwards, The Case in Favor of OCR’s Tougher Title IX Policies:  Pushing 
Back Against the Pushback, 23 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 121, 124 (2015); see also LAUREN 
J. GERMAIN, CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT:  COLLEGE WOMEN RESPOND 7 (2016); Justin Neidig, 
Note, Sex, Booze, and Clarity:  Defining Sexual Assault on a College Campus, 16 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 179, 195 (2009) (noting that studies have shown a direct causal link 
between alcohol and sexual aggression). 
 50. See Ashley Hartmann, Reworking Sexual Assault Response on University Campuses:  
Creating a Rights-Based Empowerment Model to Minimize Institutional Liability, 48 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 287, 290 (2015); see also WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, 
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admitted to using alcohol or drugs to induce intoxication and overpower their 
victims.51  The widespread use of alcohol and illegal drugs on campuses thus 
enables perpetrators to avoid using brute force to accomplish their crimes.52  
University culture fosters an environment where sexual assault thrives. 
While the rate of sexual victimization is high at the university level, the 
reality is that most students do not engage in sexual violence.  Universities 
rarely (if ever) receive complaints of sexual assault involving female 
perpetrators.53  This finding is likely the product of underreporting,54 as 
female-on-male and female-on-female sexual violence occurs throughout 
society.55  Further, only 7 percent of college men perpetrate sexual assaults, 
with “[a]pproximately two-thirds of college acquaintance 
rapists . . . averaging about four to six rapes apiece.”56  Athletes in particular 
 
at 6 (reporting that most survivors of sexual assault were abused while drugged, drunk, or 
incapacitated). 
 51. See Kathryn M. Reardon, Acquaintance Rape at Private Colleges and Universities:  
Providing for Victims’ Educational and Civil Rights, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 395, 397 (2005). 
 52. See id. at 397–98; see also COUNCIL ON WOMEN & GIRLS REPORT, supra note 43, at 14 
(“Perpetrators often prey on incapacitated women, and sometimes surreptitiously provide their 
victims with drugs or alcohol.”); Barclay Sutton Hendrix, Note, A Feather on One Side, a 
Brick on the Other:  Tilting the Scale Against Males Accused of Sexual Assault in Campus 
Disciplinary Proceedings, 47 GA. L. REV. 591, 595–96 (2013) (reporting that 75–90 percent 
of acquaintance rapes on campuses involve alcohol or drugs, and nearly 75 percent of rape 
victims are intoxicated at the time of the attack). 
 53. See, e.g., Bleiler v. Coll. of the Holy Cross, No. 11-11541, 2013 WL 4714340, at *8 
(D. Mass. Aug. 26, 2013) (explaining that the college has not received any complaints of 
female-on-male sexual assault). 
 54. See Factsheets:  Male Rape, N.Y.C. ALLIANCE AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT, 
http://www.svfreenyc.org/survivors_factsheet_38.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https:// 
perma.cc/QN6L-E9U9]. 
 55. See COUNCIL ON WOMEN & GIRLS REPORT, supra note 43, at 9 (noting that “1 in 71 
men—or almost 1.6 million—have been raped during their lives”); see also Responding to 
Transgender Victims of Sexual Assault:  Perpetrator Issues, OFF. FOR VICTIMS CRIME (June 
2014), http://www.ovc.gov/pubs/forge/tips_gender.html (stating that approximately “one-
quarter of all sexual violence victims report a female assailant”) [https://perma.cc/ZBN3-
HM6S].  Despite the reality of underreporting, some scholars have used the lack of data on 
female perpetrators to characterize sexual assault as a predominantly male crime. See 
Understanding the Perpetrator, U. MICH.:  SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & AWARENESS 
CTR., https://sapac.umich.edu/article/196 (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) (describing sexual 
assault perpetrators as white males) [https://perma.cc/3CJF-3P83].  The author does not 
endorse this perception but recognizes the limitations that underreporting places on 
comprehensively evaluating sexual assault perpetrators.  For this Article, given that only male 
students have sued their universities for reverse sex discrimination under Title IX, the author 
uses male pronouns to describe perpetrators and female pronouns to depict victims.  The use 
of these pronouns is purely for simplicity, and in no way discounts the reality that females also 
commit sexual misconduct. 
 56. See Reardon, supra note 51, at 398; see also COUNCIL ON WOMEN & GIRLS REPORT, 
supra note 43, at 14 (highlighting a study that “found that 7% of college men admitted to 
committing rape or attempted rape, and 63% of these men admitted to committing multiple 
offenses, averaging six rapes each”); Oehme et al., supra note 42, at 349 (“[R]epeat predators 
may account for as many as nine out of every ten rapes.”); THE HUNTING GROUND, supra note 
41 (reporting that less than 8 percent of college men commit more than 90 percent of sexual 
assaults, with repeat offenders engaging in six or more acts of sexual violence). But see Halley 
Sutton, Study Finds Campus Sexual Assaults Less Likely to Be Perpetrated by Serial Rapists, 
CAMPUS SECURITY REP., Feb. 2016, at 9, 9 (“Four out of five men who committed rape on 
campus were not repeat offenders.”). 
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are believed to effectuate a disproportionate number of sexual assaults on 
campus, even though they account for only 3.3 percent of the collegiate 
population.57  Comparably, fraternity members are thought to commit a 
“disproportionate number of gang rapes” on college campuses.58  Therefore, 
while the number of sexual assaults on campuses remains high, the known 
perpetrator pool is probably relatively limited. 
B.  Using Title IX as a Weapon to Curb Sexual Misconduct 
The campus sexual assault epidemic has received widespread national 
attention.59  In 2010, President Barack Obama instructed federal agencies to 
prioritize domestic and sexual violence, and the White House Council on 
Women and Girls and the Office of the Vice President held the first national 
roundtable on sexual assault.60  As part of this initiative, Vice President Joe 
Biden and Department of Education Secretary Arne Duncan implemented 
new guidance to strengthen sexual assault prevention and response policies 
at universities.61  This guidance, expressed in the 2011 DCL, set forth OCR’s 
interpretation of Title IX—specifically that Title IX holds universities 
responsible for sexual assault that occurs on campus.62  This section 
summarizes the relevant provisions and interpretations of Title IX and 
analyzes the disciplinary procedures used by universities in sexual 
misconduct cases. 
1.  Title IX Basics 
Title IX is a deceptively short but incredibly powerful one-sentence statute 
that prohibits discrimination based on sex in educational institutions that 
receive federal funding.63  Enacted in 1972, Title IX seeks to curb the use of 
federal resources to promote discriminatory practices.64  In particular, 
Congress intended for Title IX “to supplement the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s 
 
 57. See Nick Rammell, Title IX and the Dear Colleague Letter:  An Ounce of Prevention 
Is Worth a Pound of Cure, 2014 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 135, 135; see also Amy Ellis Nutt, A 
Shocking Number of College Men Surveyed Admit Coercing a Partner into Sex, WASH. POST 
(June 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2016/06/03/more-
than-half-of-college-athletes-surveyed-at-one-university-admit-coercing-a-partner-into-sex/ 
[https://perma.cc/YV4S-R3YX]. 
 58. See Lauren P. Schroeder, Cracks in the Ivory Tower:  How the Campus Sexual 
Violence Elimination Act Can Protect Students from Sexual Assault, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1195, 
1200 (2014). 
 59. See Napolitano, supra note 47, at 389. 
 60. See COUNCIL ON WOMEN & GIRLS REPORT, supra note 43, at 7, 19. 
 61. See id. at 25. 
 62. See 2011 DCL, supra note 20, at 4–16. 
 63. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”); 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a) (2016). 
 64. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979); Margaret E. Juliano, 
Forty Years of Title IX:  History and New Applications, 14 DEL. L. REV. 83, 83 (2013); 
Christopher M. Parent, Personal Fouls:  How Sexual Assault by Football Players Is Exposing 
Universities to Title IX Liability, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 617, 625 
(2003). 
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ban on racial discrimination in the workplace and in universities.”65  
Accordingly, Title IX shares the same substantive goals as Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and has been interpreted in accordance with Title 
VI precedent.66 
OCR has assumed primary responsibility for enforcement of Title IX.67  
Because OCR is a federal agency, its guidelines are entitled to deference by 
legislative and judicial bodies.68  OCR’s primary goal is to ensure that 
federally funded educational institutions have adequate, fair, and effective 
procedures in place for addressing sex discrimination.  Anyone who 
experiences discrimination or suspects a Title IX violation may file a 
complaint with OCR within 180 days of the alleged incident.69  Upon receipt 
of a complaint, OCR may conduct an investigation of the offending 
university.  If the investigation yields evidence of sex discrimination, OCR 
has express authority to terminate the university’s federal funding.70  Prior to 
eliminating funding, however, OCR must provide the university with an 
opportunity to voluntarily resolve the violations.71  To date, OCR has never 
revoked a university’s funding.72  Given that almost all colleges and 
universities in the United States receive some form of federal financing,73 
OCR’s authority and Title IX’s prohibitions are expansive. 
In addition to ensuring conformity with Title IX, OCR provides specific 
and technical guidance regarding institutional policies and responses to 
discrimination.74  This insight occurs in the form of “Dear Colleague” letters, 
which remind universities of their compliance obligations and set forth 
 
 65. Marshall v. Ohio Univ., No. 2:15-cv-775, 2015 WL 7254213, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 
17, 2015). 
 66. See id.  The wording of Title IX and Title VI is virtually identical. Compare 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1681(a), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of 
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”). 
 67. See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 17. 
 68. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); 
see also Matthew R. Triplett, Sexual Assault on College Campuses:  Seeking the Appropriate 
Balance Between Due Process and Victim Protection, 62 DUKE L.J. 487, 496 (2012) 
(explaining that “courts give Chevron deference to reasonable interpretations of Title IX found 
in dear colleague letters”). 
 69. See Julie Novkov, Equality, Process, and Campus Sexual Assault, 75 MD. L. REV. 
590, 594 (2016); Schroeder, supra note 58, at 1207. 
 70. Jenni E. Spies, Comment, Winning at All Costs:  An Analysis of a University’s 
Potential Liability for Sexual Assaults Committed by Its Student Athletes, 16 MARQ. SPORTS 
L. REV. 429, 432 (2006). 
 71. See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 17; Hayley Macon et al., 
Introduction to Title IX, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 417, 430 (2000). 
 72. See Justin F. Paget, Comment, Did Gebser Cause the Metastasization of the Sexual 
Harassment Epidemic in Educational Institutions?:  A Critical Review of Sexual Harassment 
Under Title IX Ten Years Later, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1257, 1281 (2008); Tyler Kingkade, Why 
It’s Unlikely North Carolina Schools Would Lose Federal Funding over HB 2, HUFFINGTON 
POST (May 10, 2016, 4:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/north-carolina-federal-
funding_us_57320239e4b096e9f092b9c6 [https://perma.cc/R8T2-WYNU]. 
 73. See GERMAIN, supra note 49, at 9; Nicole Castle, Sexual Harassment in Education, 6 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 521, 523 (2005). 
 74. Hartmann, supra note 50, at 296. 
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specific procedures that colleges must satisfy.75  The most controversial 
guidance issued by OCR came in the form of the 2011 DCL.  The 2011 DCL 
“shifted the equality conception of Title IX in the public eye from one aimed 
primarily at women in sports to one aimed at rape and other sexual assault on 
college campuses.”76  As a result, the dialogue surrounding sexual assault on 
campuses has grown exponentially in recent years. 
Deemed a “significant development[]” in addressing campus sexual 
violence, the 2011 DCL strengthened the rights and protections for victims 
of sexual misconduct and affirmed the university’s proactive obligations to 
eliminate sexual violence.77  Immediately upon learning of an incident of 
sexual assault, the school must investigate the attack, assist the victim, and 
remedy the discrimination through the university’s disciplinary process.  In 
particular, the 2011 DCL established the following pertinent requirements:  
(1) schools must use the preponderance of the evidence standard to determine 
responsibility for sexual misconduct,78 (2) the perpetrator and victim must 
not be allowed to personally question or cross-examine each other at the 
disciplinary hearing, (3) university sexual assault investigations must be 
conducted independently from any concurrent police investigations, and (4) 
both parties must be afforded the right to appeal an erroneous judgment.79  In 
light of the 2011 DCL, universities nationwide have strengthened their 
commitment to sexual assault prevention and remediation, almost to the point 
of hyperaggression.80  Due to the looming threat of funding revocation, these 
educational institutions do not question OCR’s guidelines. 
The discretion universities afford to OCR’s Dear Colleague letters is 
concerning given that Title IX’s boundaries are “perilously undefined.”81  
The scant legislative history available for Title IX has effectively vested OCR 
with immense discretion in its interpretation and enforcement of sex 
discrimination policies.82  OCR’s recent focus on sexual assault under Title 
IX is somewhat surprising given that nothing in the statute’s plain text, 
legislative history, or first seven years of administrative enforcement 
 
 75. See Alexandra Fries, Student-on-Student Sexual Assault Policy:  How a Victim-
Centered Approach Harms Men, 39 J.C. & U.L. 633, 643 (2013). 
 76. Katharine Silbaugh, Reactive to Proactive:  Title IX’s Unrealized Capacity to Prevent 
Campus Sexual Assault, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1065 (2015). 
 77. See Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants:  Title IX and 
Sexual Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 50 (2013). 
 78. The term “preponderance of the evidence” means that the university disciplinary panel 
must be “50.01 percent” certain that the alleged perpetrator is responsible for the sexual 
misconduct. See Samantha Harris, Campus Judiciaries on Trial an Update from the Courts, 
HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/education/report/campus-
judiciaries-trial-update-the-courts [https://perma.cc/G2QR-W9XJ]. 
 79. See 2011 DCL, supra note 20, at 10–12. 
 80. See Colleges Slammed, supra note 27. 
 81. Matthew L. Daniel, Title IX and Gender Equity in College Athletics:  How Honesty 
Might Avert a Crisis, 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 255, 263. 
 82. See Paget, supra note 72, at 1260–61 (discussing the limited legislative history 
available on Title IX). 
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suggests a congressional intent to reach sexual misconduct claims.83  
Nonetheless, OCR has classified sexual assault as a form of sexual 
harassment84 and is presently investigating more than 200 universities for 
Title IX violations.85 
2.  The University’s Investigatory and Adjudicatory Roles 
in Sexual Misconduct Cases 
The 2011 DCL placed undeniable pressure on universities to prevent, 
investigate, and adjudicate sexual violence in a nonjudicial setting.86  Despite 
the fact that sexual assault—and rape in particular—is a heinous crime 
punishable by imprisonment, universities are expected to dedicate significant 
resources to prosecuting these crimes on campus through student disciplinary 
boards.87  Universities must not only safeguard victims of sexual violence 
but must also afford accused students adequate due process protection in the 
form of meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard.88  Whether 
universities are successfully satisfying these mandates is a hotly debated 
issue.89 
When a university knows or reasonably should know of an incident of 
sexual violence, it must take action to eliminate the harassing environment.90  
Universities typically initiate their investigatory process once they receive a 
report or other notification of sexual misconduct.91  A routine investigation 
includes analyzing the victim’s allegations, notifying the suspected 
perpetrator of the charges against him, obtaining the perpetrator’s factual 
statement, interviewing witnesses, and gathering any necessary evidence.92  
In a single-investigator model, the university administrator responsible for 
 
 83. See Henrick, supra note 77, at 51.  In fact, “[f]rom Title IX’s passage in 1972 until 
1997, OCR never claimed authority over rape or sexual assault between students.” Id. at 56; 
see also Paget, supra note 72, at 1260–61. 
 84. See Sexual Harassment Guidance:  Harassment of Students by School Employees, 
Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,038 (Mar. 13, 1997); see also 
Napolitano, supra note 47, at 393. 
 85. See Anemona Hartocollis, Colleges Spending Millions to Deal with Sexual 
Misconduct Complaints, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2jPRrZD 
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de4b014d3fe23d789 [https://perma.cc/AS6U-L7HC]; see also Leslie Ackerson, 167 Schools 
in Title IX Sexual Assault Investigations, WBIR.COM (Feb. 25, 2016, 11:58 AM), 
http://www.wbir.com/news/local/167-schools-in-title-ix-sexual-assault-investigations/ 
56749976 (noting that there are 208 pending Title IX investigations spanning thirty-nine states 
and 167 different schools) [https://perma.cc/Z3MY-Q2QP]. 
 86. See 2011 DCL, supra note 20, at 2, 4, 8. 
 87. See id. at 14–15. 
 88. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975). 
 89. See, e.g., Sexual Assault on Campus, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, https:// 
www.publicintegrity.org/accountability/education/sexual-assault-campus (last visited Apr. 
14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9CXP-MU5F]. 
 90. See 2011 DCL, supra note 20, at 4; Edwards, supra note 49, at 125; Schroeder, supra 
note 58, at 1203. 
 91. See generally 2011 DCL, supra note 20. 
 92. See Triplett, supra note 68, at 492–93. 
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investigating the sexual assault complaint then either renders a finding, 
presents an acceptance of responsibility agreement, or offers a disciplinary 
recommendation to the hearing panel.93  This model, while endorsed by the 
White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault, enables 
one person to simultaneously serve as detective, prosecutor, and jury.94 
In a more traditional system, the investigator furnishes a comprehensive 
information packet to the university conduct board several days prior to the 
hearing.95  Both the victim and the accused student are given access to the 
packet to prepare their cases.96  The university conduct board then holds a 
disciplinary hearing, where evidence is presented.97  Typically, members of 
the panel will question the victim, the alleged perpetrator, and any 
witnesses.98  The board has discretion to exclude any witness whose 
testimony is deemed irrelevant.99  Upon completion of the hearing, the board 
deliberates the case and distributes its written findings to both parties.100  If 
an accused student is found responsible, an explanation of the sanction may 
be included.101 
Despite these disciplinary procedures, sexual assault survivors often 
remain wary of their school’s investigatory and adjudicatory processes, and 
no more than 10 percent of victims report their experiences to university 
officials.102  The reasons for low reporting rates vary, but three are 
particularly common.  First, given the lack of a uniform definition for sexual 
assault, many victims do not classify their experiences as sexual violence.103  
Second, victims may fear retaliation from the perpetrator or his friends.  The 
White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault concluded 
 
 93. See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 14. 
 94. See Harris, supra note 78; see also WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, 
at 14 (appearing to endorse the single investigator model). 
 95. See, e.g., Student Sexual Misconduct Policy and Procedures:  Duke’s Commitment to 
Title IX, DUKE U. STUDENT AFF., https://studentaffairs.duke.edu/conduct/z-policies/student-
sexual-misconduct-policy-dukes-commitment-title-ix (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [hereinafter 
Duke Title IX Policies] (“In advance of the hearing, the Office of Student Conduct finalizes a 
packet with information it deems relevant to the case to be shared with the hearing panel.”) 
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 96. See 2011 DCL, supra note 20, at 11; Duke Title IX Policies, supra note 95 (“The Office 
of Student Conduct will share a copy of that packet with both the complainant and the 
respondent at least 120 hours in advance of the hearing.”). 
 97. See Triplett, supra note 68, at 493; see also WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra 
note 42, at 14 (acknowledging that sometimes the educational disciplinary process tracks the 
adversarial criminal justice model); Duke Title IX Policies, supra note 95 (explaining the 
disciplinary hearing procedure). 
 98. See, e.g., Duke Title IX Policies, supra note 95 (“A complainant or respondent may 
not question each other or other witnesses directly, but may raise questions to be asked of that 
party through the hearing panel, which will determine whether to ask them.”). 
 99. See, e.g., id. (“The hearing panel determines the relevancy of any information 
presented/submitted at the hearing and can exclude irrelevant information.”). 
 100. See 2011 DCL, supra note 20, at 13; Triplett, supra note 68, at 493. 
 101. See Laura L. Dunn, Addressing Sexual Violence in Higher Education:  Ensuring 
Compliance with the Clery Act, Title IX and VAWA, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 563, 581 (2014). 
 102. See Rosenfeld, supra note 40, at 367; see also WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT, 
supra note 42, at 3, 7 (“[O]nly 2% of incapacitated sexual assault survivors, and 13% of 
forcible rape survivors, report the crime to campus or local law enforcement.”). 
 103. See Hendrix, supra note 52, at 596. 
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that at least 40 percent of sexual assault survivors feared reprisal or retaliation 
from perpetrators.104  Finally, the lax punishment afforded to perpetrators by 
university officials discourages victims from pursuing their claims.  Only 30 
percent of students found responsible for sexual assault are expelled, and less 
than 50 percent are suspended.105  From 2001 to 2013, the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill reported 136 incidents of sexual assault but 
refused to expel any of the perpetrators.106  Similar statistics characterize 
sexual violence responses at Harvard University, Dartmouth College, 
Stanford University, University of California Berkeley, and University of 
Virginia.107  Victims are frequently told that disciplinary sanctions are not 
intended to be punitive in nature.108  In place of expulsions and active 
suspensions, universities impose educational sanctions or probationary 
measures that are effectively meaningless.  James Madison University, for 
example, banned three fraternity members from campus after graduation for 
sexually assaulting a female student.109  These insufficient administrative 
responses leave survivors feeling revictimized and powerless.110 
C.  Slamming the Door to Justice:  
The Silent Death of Due Process and Fairness 
The lax punishments for sexual misconduct appear to have ended.  In 
response to the 2011 DCL and the widespread distrust of university sexual 
assault policies, campus administrators are toughening their approach to 
sexual violence.  Several universities now recommend expulsion as the 
baseline punishment for sexual assault and have implemented procedures that 
favor victims.111  The desire to comply with OCR’s guidelines has resulted 
 
 104. See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 7. 
 105. See Tyler Kingkade, Fewer Than One-Third of Campus Sexual Assault Cases Result 
in Expulsion, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2014, 8:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
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 106. See THE HUNTING GROUND, supra note 41. 
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 108. See Kingkade, supra note 105. 
 109. See Tyler Kingkade, James Madison University Punished Sexual Assault with 
‘Expulsion After Graduation,’ HUFFINGTON POST (June 26, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/18/james-madison-university-sexual-assault_n_550 
9163.html [https://perma.cc/95UE-ZKNR]. 
 110. See Weizel, supra note 24, at 1614. 
 111. See, e.g., Duke Title IX Policies, supra note 95; Unified Disciplinary Procedures for 
Sexual Assault by Students and Student Organizations, DARTMOUTH, 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/sexualrespect/policies/unified-sexual-assault-policy.html (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2017) (stating that “[t]he sanction shall be separation from the College (i.e., 
expulsion)” if the accused perpetrator used force, threats, or intentional incapacitation of the 
victim to have sex) [https://perma.cc/4WMR-TQV3]; see also Jake New, Expulsion 
Presumed, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 27, 2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/ 
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in harsher treatment of male perpetrators and unfair disciplinary policies that 
deny assailants their right to due process and the presumption of innocence.  
As accused students are learning, the Title IX playing field is imbalanced and 
“creates disproportionate incentives to punish innocent students.”112 
The below hypothetical combined with John’s experience described in the 
introduction illustrate the most common violations of due process and 
fairness that strip accused students of their ability to defend themselves.  
Without the opportunity to mount a defense, accused students are punished 
for crimes they may not have committed.113  This disciplinary structure leads 
to an unconstitutional pattern or practice of presumed male guilt.  
Accordingly, this section explores due process violations experienced by 
students and explains how OCR pressures universities into promulgating 
decidedly provictim policies. 
1.  Guilty Until Proven Innocent:  
A Representative Hypothetical 
The below hypothetical is reflective of the experiences accused students 
may endure during the campus disciplinary process.  Names and dates have 
been changed, but the substance of the story originates from actual reverse 
Title IX complaints.  The hypothetical and subsequent discussion in this 
Article do not distinguish between legitimate and spurious sexual assault 
allegations.  Rather, the focus is solely on the perpetrator’s alleged 
deprivation of due process during the disciplinary proceeding, regardless of 
the validity of the campus complaint. 
Andrew, a male sophomore, and Veronica, a female freshman, engaged in 
sexual intercourse at a party on May 20, 2013.  A year later, on May 30, 2014, 
Veronica filed a sexual assault complaint against Andrew.  The complaint 
alleged that Andrew coerced Veronica into having sex with him and that 
Veronica was incapable of consenting because she was intoxicated. 
The university’s Title IX investigator, Irene Simons, contacted Andrew on 
June 5, 2014, and advised him of the complaint.  Simons refused to provide 
Andrew with a copy of Veronica’s allegations and failed to advise him of his 
rights under the student code.  The university further issued a no-contact 
order prohibiting communication between Andrew and Veronica. 
Following the initial meeting, Andrew submitted a written statement to 
Simons that included a list of witnesses who interacted with the parties before 
and after the sexual encounter.  Andrew told Simons that the eight witnesses 
were willing to be interviewed with respect to Veronica’s claims.  A month 
later, Simons conducted a follow-up meeting with Andrew but had not 
 
06/27/should-expulsion-be-default-discipline-policy-students-accused-sexual-assault (stating 
that Dartmouth College and Duke University set expulsion as the baseline punishment for 
sexual assault but other universities still consider expulsion on a case-by-case basis) 
[https://perma.cc/2LQA-2Y4C]. 
 112. Henrick, supra note 77, at 79. 
 113. Recent studies suggest that sexual assault has the same percentage of false reporting 
as any other crime—typically between 2 and 8 percent. See THE HUNTING GROUND, supra note 
41. 
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interviewed any of his witnesses.  By that same time, however, Simons had 
discussed the events with seven female witnesses who were friends with 
Veronica.  Only one of the witnesses Simons interviewed had been present 
at the party where the alleged sexual misconduct occurred. 
When Andrew inquired as to Simons’s interview timeline for his 
witnesses, Simons responded that she planned to speak with several of 
Andrew’s witnesses in the coming weeks but would not be interviewing all 
of them.  In particular, Simons said that she would not interview Joe 
Hancock, who was the first person to see Veronica immediately after the 
alleged sexual assault, because Simons had already established that Veronica 
was drunk that night.  On August 1, 2014, before Simons had interviewed 
any of Andrew’s proposed witnesses, the university charged Andrew with 
nonconsensual sexual intercourse. 
One week later, Andrew received a copy of Simons’s preliminary 
investigation report, which supported the charges.  The report included 
unsubstantiated rumors by Veronica’s witnesses who were not present at the 
party.  Simons only interviewed one of Andrew’s witnesses before releasing 
the report.  At no point did Simons speak with Hancock, who was the only 
person in Veronica’s room that night immediately after the alleged assault.  
In the weeks following the report’s release, Simons interviewed four of 
Andrew’s witnesses but declined to interview the remainder.  When Andrew 
requested that Simons conduct additional interviews, Simons explained that 
she had concluded her investigation.  Simons additionally refused to consider 
text messages between the parties supporting Andrew’s version of events. 
Five days prior to the disciplinary hearing, Andrew received notice that his 
final case file, which would be presented at the hearing, was available for 
review.  Andrew was not provided a copy of his file and was only allowed to 
examine the file during normal business hours at the student conduct office.  
At no point in time was Andrew allowed to review the specific allegations in 
Veronica’s complaint. 
On October 8, 2014, the university held a student conduct hearing on the 
charges.  As the complainant, Veronica was provided a university advocate 
who sat next to her and communicated with her throughout the hearing.  
Veronica was further allowed to have an advisor and an attorney, but the 
attorney was not permitted to speak during the hearing.  In contrast, Andrew 
was not offered a university advocate and had only a faculty advisor to assist 
him. 
The panel questioned Veronica first, allowing her to speak for 
approximately thirty minutes with calm, nonaggressive questions interjected 
throughout her testimony.  Veronica’s use of buzzwords throughout the 
hearing suggested that she had been well prepared by the university advocate 
and her advisor.  The panel did not question Veronica about the gaps or 
inconsistencies in her testimony.  Neither Veronica nor her witnesses were 
required to provide any evidence to support their statements.  The panel 
refused to ask Andrew’s proposed questions that challenged Veronica’s 
credibility and the motives of her witnesses. 
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Although the student code guaranteed Andrew the ability to make a brief 
opening statement and use a midpoint statement to respond to Veronica’s 
testimony, the hearing panel stopped Andrew a few seconds into his midpoint 
testimony.  The panel questioned Andrew for over ninety minutes, and ended 
the hearing before all of Andrew’s witnesses had an opportunity to testify.  
Instead of treating Andrew as innocent until proven guilty, the university 
assigned Andrew the burden of proof.  Furthermore, the university prohibited 
Andrew from introducing evidence outside of the hearing packet to contradict 
Veronica’s testimony.  A week later, the university found Andrew 
responsible for sexual assault and suspended him for three years. 
2.  Understanding Due Process Deprivation 
The above hypothetical portrays the common experience of accused 
perpetrators in campus sexual assault proceedings.  Universities routinely fail 
to notify accused perpetrators of their rights, deny assailants an opportunity 
to review the victim’s complaint, refuse to interview key defense witnesses, 
withhold important investigatory findings and information from the 
defendants until days before the hearing, decline to cross-examine the victim 
or her witnesses on issues of credibility and inconsistent testimony, and 
refuse to admit key documents, such as text messages or Facebook posts, that 
may exonerate the accused.114  In some instances, victims are coached by 
numerous advisors and university administrators regarding what to say 
during the disciplinary hearing and are often better prepared to testify than 
the accused perpetrators who are only provided with one faculty advisor.115  
These university actions can sacrifice the perpetrator’s quest for truth and 
justice.  Consequently, alleged assailants are left wondering why their rights 
and interests have been so easily neglected.  The answer lies in OCR’s 
unbalanced influence over university disciplinary structures. 
The skewed nature of campus disciplinary proceedings is traceable to 
OCR’s policy agenda, which has taken a decidedly provictim perspective.116  
Since 1997, OCR has failed to take any action of ensuring that campus sexual 
assault proceedings are equitable for alleged perpetrators.117  The 2011 DCL, 
for instance, allocated only two sentences out of its nineteen pages to discuss 
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 117. See Henrick, supra note 77, at 52–53. 
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due process protections for alleged assailants.118  Rather, OCR’s guidance 
has focused almost exclusively on heightening interim and long-term 
protection for victims and ensuring that universities foster an environment in 
which victims feel safe reporting their attacks.  These objectives, while 
extremely laudable and undeniably necessary,119 must be accomplished in a 
manner that does not impinge on the rights of accused perpetrators.  By 
focusing only on the interests of victims to the exclusion of the rights of 
alleged perpetrators, the sole organization responsible for eliminating sex 
discrimination within educational institutions has unwittingly created a new 
form of gender bias.  The policies espoused in the 2011 DCL formalize “a 
presumption of guilt in campus adjudications” and imply “that the rights of 
accused students at public colleges do not merit lengthy discussion.”120 
Unfortunately, universities are caught in the middle of OCR’s policy 
agenda and the battle for due process.  Without question, universities face 
unrelenting pressure from OCR to adopt the espoused policies or lose federal 
funding.121  For some educational institutions, the sum at stake exceeds half 
a billion dollars.122  Because OCR emphasizes complainants’ rights, 
conviction of an accused perpetrator “carries a much lower risk of 
administrative enforcement than acquittal.”123  OCR has accepted fewer than 
five Title IX complaints from male sexual assault perpetrators,124 but it is 
currently investigating more than 200 universities based on complaints from 
female sexual violence victims.125  Universities that risk or defy OCR’s 
recommendations in favor of leveling the playing field for accused students 
are all but guaranteed to be the next target of an administrative investigation. 
Moreover, administrative complaints—even those that are voluntarily 
resolved with OCR—cost universities time and money.  OCR grievances 
typically require universities to engage in extensive document production, 
which is commonly outsourced to local or large law firms at premium 
rates.126  This document production can span months or years depending on 
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the volume of documents, the university’s record-keeping structures, and the 
number of university officials involved in the investigation.127  The estimated 
“cost of lawyers, counselors, information campaigns and training to fight 
sexual misconduct ranges from $25,000 a year at a small college to $500,000 
and up at larger or wealthier institutions.”128  Handling a Title IX inquiry 
could easily reach six figures and responding to Title IX civil lawsuits “can 
run into the high six or even seven figures, not counting a settlement or 
verdict.”129  It is financially safer for universities to adopt OCR’s policies as 
written rather than defend assailants’ due process guarantees and risk 
backlash from OCR.130 
Additionally, OCR investigations threaten a university’s reputation.  The 
general public can easily access an electronic list of all universities currently 
facing inquiry by OCR.131  Placement on this list may negatively affect a 
university’s social standing and, consequently, result in decreased 
applications for admission.  A reduced applicant pool not only impacts the 
university’s revenue stream but could also distort admission statistics and 
result in the university admitting less qualified applicants to keep enrollment 
numbers steady.  Thus, regardless of the merit of an OCR complaint, the mere 
threat of an investigation can wreak havoc on a university’s resources and 
finances.  Universities have more economic and reputational incentives to 
comply with OCR’s mandates than to create fair disciplinary structures.132 
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Further, the denial of due process to accused perpetrators is a result of 
institutional structure.  Universities were not designed as court units, yet 
OCR has forced colleges to undertake judicial functions.133  Universities are 
tasked with investigating and adjudicating a student’s responsibility for 
essentially criminal action, yet they lack due process guarantees, uniform 
civil procedure, and evidentiary rules.134  There is no prohibition against ex 
parte communications between the complainant and disciplinary board and 
no requirement that universities disclose exculpatory evidence to the 
accused.135  Moreover, no formal discovery procedures exist to aid alleged 
perpetrators with their defenses.136  The lack of inherent procedural 
safeguards automatically places perpetrators at a disadvantage in the 
educational disciplinary process.  Burdening universities with sexual assault 
adjudications without simultaneously implementing due process protections 
and standardized procedures is fundamentally unfair to both the university 
system and accused assailants.  For this reason, academic scholarship has 
advocated for the removal of sexual violence claims from the educational 
disciplinary system to the civil and criminal judicial forums.137  According 
to scholars, this change of venue will increase the probability that the accused 
perpetrator’s case will be decided on the merits, not based on OCR’s political 
agenda. 
II.  ACCUSED CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT PERPETRATORS 
FIGHT BACK 
The unfairness associated with university disciplinary proceedings has not 
gone unnoticed.  Students accused of sexual misconduct are pushing back 
against their sentences, arguing that university policies threaten their liberty 
and property interests and are evidence of sex discrimination against males.  
The closure of justice’s doors during the university disciplinary process has 
forced accused students to seek vindication of their rights in courts of law.  
More than 100 male students accused of sexual violence have filed lawsuits 
against their universities challenging the sufficiency and legality of the 
educational investigatory and adjudicatory functions.138  These lawsuits 
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routinely include claims for reverse Title IX discrimination, due process 
violations, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and negligence.139  
Although due process and breach of contract allegations are currently the 
most successful, accused perpetrators are increasing the frequency with 
which they assert Title IX reverse discrimination claims.140 
While the typical conception of a Title IX claim conjures images of sexual 
assault victims, accused perpetrators are frequently alleging gender bias in 
university disciplinary proceedings.141  Given the increasingly broad 
definition of campus sexual violence and use of the preponderance of the 
evidence standard, scholars predict a steady increase in the number of reverse 
Title IX lawsuits filed in the next few years.142  As an initial observation, 
sexual assault perpetrators do not regularly file complaints with OCR; rather, 
they initiate lawsuits in a judicial arena where their rights can be conclusively 
established.143  As of April 2015, OCR had only accepted two complaints for 
investigation filed by accused perpetrators of sexual assault.144  This low 
acceptance rate discourages alleged perpetrators from filing OCR 
complaints, particularly given that OCR is responsible for the 2011 DCL.  
Thus, formal judicial action is the preferred, and arguably only, vehicle to 
redress accused student grievances. 
When asserting a reverse Title IX claim, accused perpetrators most 
commonly proceed under either the erroneous outcome doctrine or selective 
enforcement theory.145  Both approaches require intentional sex 
discrimination, as lawsuits premised on disparate impact cannot be 
maintained under Title IX.146  To sufficiently state an erroneous outcome 
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claim, the accused perpetrator must allege two elements:  (1) facts that cast 
sufficient doubt on the accuracy of the outcome of the disciplinary 
proceeding and (2) a causal connection between the incorrect outcome and 
gender bias.147  The gravamen of an erroneous outcome claim is that an 
otherwise innocent student was wrongly found responsible for committing 
sexual assault because of his gender.148  In contrast, a selective enforcement 
claim argues that even if an accused sexual assault perpetrator violated a 
university policy, the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the severity 
of the sanction imposed were motivated by gender bias.149  Supporting a 
selective enforcement claim typically requires the alleged perpetrator to 
demonstrate that the university treated a female student, who faced 
substantially similar circumstances as the male student, more favorably 
during the disciplinary process.150  Thus, the success of a selective 
enforcement claim hinges on the perpetrator’s ability to contrast his 
disciplinary experience with that of an accused female sexual assault 
perpetrator. 
Although the allegations for erroneous outcome and selective enforcement 
claims vary based on the particular case and facts, the basic structure the 
complaints assume is almost identical.  In particular, accused perpetrators 
regularly argue that sexual assault complaints are disproportionately lodged 
against male students and that universities have a pattern of finding accused 
men responsible for sexual violence.151  In most lawsuits, accused 
perpetrators highlight that there have been no reported male complaints of 
sexual violence against female assailants and, therefore, no accused female 
perpetrator has been disciplined for sexual misconduct against a male 
victim.152  The lawsuits further allege that female victims are treated more 
favorably than male defendants throughout the disciplinary process and 
universities afford greater weight to the victim’s testimony than the 
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perpetrator’s recitation of facts.153  Accused assailants commonly describe 
procedural deficiencies, evidentiary weaknesses, examples of the victim’s 
favorable treatment, and historical disciplinary data against males in support 
of their claims of gender discrimination.154  Additionally, alleged 
perpetrators perceive this gender bias as a consequence of the increased 
pressure universities face to aggressively pursue and discipline males 
accused of sexual violence in light of the 2011 DCL.155  Consequently, males 
maintain that once a sexual assault complaint is filed, the accused perpetrator 
will invariably be found responsible. 
III.  PLEADING REVERSE TITLE IX CLAIMS 
AND EVALUATING JUDICIAL RESPONSES 
Despite the increasing frequency with which accused sexual assault 
perpetrators allege reverse Title IX claims, the judicial reaction to these 
allegations has been overwhelmingly negative.  The majority of courts 
dismiss reverse Title IX lawsuits pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) (i.e., a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim) for lack of 
evidence of gender bias.156  These courts hold that while accused students 
have successfully pleaded procedural deficiencies during the investigatory 
and adjudicatory processes, they nonetheless failed to factually support their 
allegations that the university’s actions were taken because of the student’s 
gender.157  This approach, however, results from a misguided application of 
plausibility pleading.  In particular, the majority of courts read Twombly and 
Iqbal as requiring specific evidentiary support for each element of a reverse 
Title IX claim at the outset of the lawsuit.158  When perpetrators lack 
particularized evidence of discriminatory motive at the pleading stage, courts 
quickly dismiss the action based on causal insufficiency.159  This outlook is 
fundamentally flawed because courts perceive Twombly and Iqbal as existing 
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in isolation and ignore the third leg of the stool:  Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 
N.A.160  By demanding data, statistics, or particularized evidence to prove 
causation at the 12(b)(6) stage, courts purposefully neglect the express 
prohibition against requiring a prima facie case of discrimination at the 
pleading phase. 
This part explains the requirements for pleading reverse Title IX claims 
pre-Iqbal and analyzes how plausibility pleading has altered the motion to 
dismiss landscape for discrimination actions.  Specifically, this part offers a 
comprehensive overview of Twombly, Iqbal, and Swierkiewicz, and it 
concludes that the majority’s prodismissal stance is reflective of a broader 
misunderstanding of the interaction between these three cases.  In 
conjunction with this proposition, this part provides an empirical analysis 
regarding dismissal trends at the federal court level.  Finally, this part 
highlights how to plausibly plead causality in reverse Title IX claims under 
this misguided interpretation. 
A.  Establishing a Baseline 
for Reverse Title IX Lawsuits Pre-Iqbal 
Before 2007, the standard for pleading a reverse Title IX sex 
discrimination claim was well established by the Second Circuit in Yusuf v. 
Vassar College.161  In Yusuf, James Weisman, a student at Vassar College, 
physically attacked Syed Saifuddin Yusuf, a male student, on February 11, 
1992.162  The Poughkeepsie Police Department arrested Weisman for 
intoxication and battery, and the college regulations panel at Vassar College 
separately scheduled a disciplinary hearing for February 17, 1992.163  
Although the attack left Yusuf unconscious and decorated with multiple 
bruises, Weisman and his girlfriend, Tina Kapur, tried to dissuade Yusuf 
from pressing formal or disciplinary charges.164  The parties initially agreed 
that Yusuf would drop all charges in exchange for Weisman’s payment of 
Yusuf’s medical expenses.165  However, Weisman later renounced this 
agreement and Yusuf pressed charges.166 
At the disciplinary hearing, the college regulations panel questioned Yusuf 
about his relationship with Kapur, not Weisman’s battery.167  At least two 
panelists were friends with Kapur and Weisman.168  While the panel found 
Weisman responsible for the battery, it recommended a suspended sanction 
for the spring semester.169  Additionally, one day before Weisman’s criminal 
court date, Yusuf discovered that Kapur was contemplating filing a sexual 
 
 160. 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
 161. 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 162. See id. at 711–12. 
 163. See id. at 712. 
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 166. See id. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id. 
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harassment complaint against him.170  Vassar informed Yusuf of the sexual 
harassment complaint on April 8, 1992, and instructed him to appear for a 
hearing on the charges five days later.171 
Prior to the sexual harassment hearing, Yusuf submitted a list of twelve 
witnesses, but the university reduced the witness list to seven.172  The 
university prohibited Yusuf from photocopying Kapur’s complaint and 
refused to allow a statement from one of Yusuf’s witnesses who was out of 
town.173  At the hearing, the college regulations panel declined to admit 
Yusuf’s medical records showing that he was confined to the infirmary 
during one of the alleged assaults and allowed only five of Yusuf’s witnesses 
to testify.174  Unsurprisingly, the panel found Yusuf responsible for sexual 
assault and suspended him for a year.175  After an unsuccessful appeal, Yusuf 
filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York alleging, among other 
things, a Title IX erroneous outcome claim.176  The district court dismissed 
Yusuf’s Title IX allegations for lack of evidence of gender discrimination, 
and Yusuf subsequently appealed.177 
In reversing the district court’s dismissal of the Title IX claim, the Second 
Circuit held that a plaintiff must “allege particular circumstances suggesting 
that gender bias was a motivating factor behind the erroneous finding.”178  
Allegations of procedurally flawed disciplinary hearings combined with 
conclusory statements of sex discrimination are insufficient to survive a 
motion to dismiss.179  Yusuf’s complaint, however, satisfied this pleading 
standard because the allegations referred to specific events that could support 
an inference of discrimination: 
 Fairly read, Yusuf’s complaint alleges that a false and somewhat stale 
charge of sexual harassment was made against him only after he pursued 
criminal charges for a brutal assault by the complainant’s boyfriend.  It 
alleges that he was on good terms with the complainant after the alleged 
incidents of sexual harassment and until he pursued those criminal charges.  
Yusuf’s complaint further alleges that various actions by the presiding 
official of the disciplinary tribunal prevented him from fully defending 
himself.  Finally, he asserts that males accused of sexual harassment at 
Vassar are “historically and systematically” and “invariably found guilty, 
regardless of the evidence, or lack thereof.” 
 Similar allegations, if based on race in employment decisions, would 
more than suffice in a Title VII case, and we believe they easily meet the 
requirements of Title IX.  They go well beyond the surmises of the plaintiff 
as to what was in the minds of others and involve provable events that in 
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 177. See id. 
 178. Id. at 715. 
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the aggregate would allow a trier of fact to find that gender affected the 
outcome of the disciplinary proceeding.180 
Thus, Yusuf’s factual statements, which evidenced a deficient disciplinary 
hearing, combined with an accusation that the university systematically 
discriminated against males, were deemed sufficient to support a sex 
discrimination claim.  The plaintiff did not support this causal link with 
statistical data and did not explain the alleged historical and systemic 
discrimination by the university.  Since 1994, this pleading framework has 
strongly influenced reverse Title IX rulings on motions to dismiss, even 
outside the Second Circuit.181 
While Yusuf remains the primary authority for reverse Title IX claims, 
courts have begun to question its applicability to post-Twombly and Iqbal 
lawsuits.  As discussed below, Twombly and Iqbal established a plausibility 
pleading standard in which conclusory allegations are disregarded, and 
factual statements must be sufficient to push a claim from speculative to 
plausible.182  When the Second Circuit decided Yusuf in 1994, judicial review 
of complaints operated under the more relaxed and lenient Conley v. 
Gibson183 standard, which prohibited dismissal of complaints unless the 
plaintiff could prove “no set of facts” that would entitle her to relief.184  The 
modern day plausibility standard is more stringent and demanding than 
Conley’s notice pleading requirement.185  For this reason, courts applying 
Yusuf post-2007 exhibit extreme confusion over the proper pleading 
framework to employ in reverse Title IX actions. 
B.  A Review of Twombly, Iqbal, and Swierkiewicz 
For more than fifty years, the judicial system operated under a liberal 
pleading standard in which a complaint would not be dismissed unless the 
plaintiff could prove “no set of facts” that would entitle her to relief.186  This 
framework, set forth in Conley, established notice pleading as the baseline 
for judging a complaint’s allegations and created a low bar for surviving a 
motion to dismiss.187  When evaluating dismissal motions, courts were 
 
 180. Id. at 716. 
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544, 555 (2007). 
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 186. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45. 
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required to accept all allegations in the complaint as true and draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.188  This standard mandated 
deference to the plaintiff’s complaint and favored civil rights complainants 
who lacked specific factual data to support their accusations.189  When 
combined with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8,190 this pleading regime 
reflected an undeniable intent to grant plaintiffs their day in court and to 
ensure that defendants simply had notice of the claims.191 
In 2007, however, the pillars of notice pleading crumbled, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court erected the foundation of plausibility pleading.  In Twombly, 
the Court explained that a plaintiff must set forth the grounds demonstrating 
her entitlement to relief.192  A complaint must contain “more than labels and 
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 
will not do.”193  While the complaint need not include detailed factual 
statements, its allegations must be sufficient “to raise a right to relief above 
the speculative level.”194  In altering this pleading analysis, the Court retired 
Conley’s no set of facts standard, reasoning that the prior test was incomplete 
and outdated.195 
Expanding on this framework in its 2009 Iqbal decision, the Supreme 
Court reiterated that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 demands more than 
unadorned conclusory allegations for all civil lawsuits.196  Surviving a 
motion to dismiss requires adequately pled factual circumstances that state a 
plausible claim for relief.197  According to the Court, “A claim has facial 
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.”198  This standard requires more than speculative statements that 
showcase a mere possibility of illegal conduct by the defendant.199  Rather, 
the allegations in the complaint must demonstrate plausible misconduct.  The 
question of whether a complaint satisfies this plausibility threshold is case 
specific and requires the reviewing judge to use her judicial experience and 
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common sense.200  In particular, the complainant must explain with facts how 
the defendant violated a specific statute or common law principle.201 
When evaluating a motion to dismiss under the plausibility standard, 
courts must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint.202  
Conclusory statements or threadbare recitals of a claim’s elements are not 
entitled to a presumption of veracity.203  The rationale for this distinction is 
basic:  conclusory accusations fail to distinguish the case at issue from every 
other hypothetical lawsuit.204  Without this distinction, the defendant lacks 
sufficient notice of the claims against him and cannot mount a comprehensive 
defense. 
Accordingly, when considering a dismissal motion, a court must conduct 
a two-step analysis:  (1) identify and distinguish the factual allegations, which 
are presumed true, from the conclusory statements, which are not credited 
and can be disregarded, and (2) decide whether the factual allegations support 
a plausible and reasonable inference that the defendant committed the 
proposed misconduct.205  Courts should remember that plausibility pleading 
does not require facts demonstrating probability of relief.206 
The adoption of plausibility pleading forced courts to grapple with the 
proper standard for alleging discrimination in civil rights cases.  One 
controversy for civil rights suits following Twombly and Iqbal was whether 
plaintiffs must allege a prima facie case of discrimination at the pleading 
stage.207  In Swierkiewicz, decided pre-Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that the 
prima facie elements of discrimination reflect an evidentiary standard, not a 
pleading requirement.208  The elements of a prima facie case vary based on 
the context and factual circumstances of the lawsuit and “should not be 
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transposed into a rigid pleading standard for discrimination cases.”209  In 
support of this holding, the Court explained that discrimination claims are 
not subject to heightened pleading standards and must only satisfy basic 
notice requirements.210  While Swierkiewicz dealt specifically with 
employment discrimination lawsuits, its holding is transferable to 
comparable civil rights contexts, including Title IX.211 
The implementation of plausibility pleading, however, caused some courts 
to question whether a plaintiff now had to prove prima facie discrimination 
at the outset of the suit.212  While the Supreme Court insisted that Twombly 
did not overrule Swierkiewicz,213 numerous courts found this assertion 
incompatible with the creation of a heightened pleading standard for all cases.  
These courts have required plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination at the pleading stage to satisfy the plausibility standard.214  
The better view, however, is to perceive Twombly, Iqbal, and Swierkiewicz 
as compatible in the following manner:  discrimination claims are subject to 
the same “heightened” (i.e., plausibility) pleading standard as all routine civil 
actions, and a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to give 
the claim credibility, but the allegations need not mirror or rise to the level of 
a prima facie case.215  By transposing the central holding of Swierkiewicz—
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that a prima facie case is not a pleading standard—into the post-Iqbal 
plausibility framework, the cases are undeniably consistent.  Thus, plaintiffs 
do not need to establish a prima facie case of discrimination at the pleading 
stage post-Iqbal. 
C.  Judicial Responses to Reverse Title IX Claims Post-Iqbal:  
An Empirical Analysis 
Despite the compatibility between Twombly, Iqbal, and Swierkiewicz, 
district courts are fundamentally divided on their application of plausibility 
pleading to reverse Title IX claims.  This section provides the first empirical 
study analyzing dismissal trends for reverse Title IX lawsuits.  In short, the 
study finds that most post-Iqbal courts dismiss reverse Title IX claims 
brought by accused sexual assault perpetrators for failure to plead a prima 
facie case of discrimination.  These courts isolate the factual and evidentiary 
support for discriminatory causation and dismiss complaints that do not 
evince a strong probability of discriminatory animus.  By requiring accused 
perpetrators to plead particularized data, statistics, or discriminatory 
statements made by university officials without the use of discovery, the 
majority perpetuates a catch-22 scenario:  a plaintiff cannot access 
discriminatory evidence without the use of discovery, but the complaint is 
dismissed before the discovery stage.216 
The catch-22 dooms these lawsuits from the outset.  A minority of courts, 
however, recognize the inevitability of the catch-22 dilemma and properly 
view factual sufficiency as applying to the complaint as a whole, not to each 
individualized prima facie element.  These judges perceive an inequality in 
requiring accused students to cite discriminatory data that is in the possession 
of university administrators without the use of discovery.217  Judges who 
acknowledge the difficulty of establishing a causal connection between 
gender and disciplinary errors at the pleading stage hold that there is no 
heightened pleading requirement for discrimination.  Accordingly, merely 
alleging the causation element is sufficient.218  As a result, the judicial 
districts are deeply divided on whether to progress a reverse Title IX claim 
to discovery if the accused perpetrator merely states that the university 
discriminated against him based on his sex or that the university has a pattern 
or practice of discrimination, without offering additional factual evidence. 
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1.  Empirical Study:  Purpose and Methodology 
The purpose of this empirical study is to document dismissal trends for 
reverse Title IX lawsuits and to analyze the stated rationales accompanying 
these dismissals.  By undertaking this analysis, the goal is to contribute to the 
evolving dialogue on the impacts of Twombly and Iqbal in the civil rights 
context and to expand this discussion to the Title IX arena.  Understanding 
judicial standards for reverse Title IX actions further enables the legal 
community to identify common pleading requirements for these cases—even 
if those pleading requirements depart from the plausibility standard 
framework. 
To document judicial positions on reverse Title IX claims, I conducted a 
comprehensive Westlaw search using the following search parameters.  First, 
because Title IX is a federal statute, I limited the analysis to federal district 
and circuit court cases.  Second, given that only post-Iqbal interpretations of 
reverse Title IX claims are relevant, I restricted the date range from June 1, 
2009, to August 31, 2016.  Third, I conducted numerous keyword searches 
looking for variants of “Title IX,” “reverse Title IX,” “erroneous outcome,” 
and “selective enforcement.”  In particular, the searches included:  (1) “adv:  
‘Title IX’ w/100 ‘erroneous outcome’” (resulting in thirty-four cases), (2) 
“adv:  ‘Title IX’ w/100 ‘selective enforcement’” (resulting in twenty-seven 
cases), (3) “adv:  ‘reverse Title IX’” (resulting in zero cases), (4) “adv:  ‘Title 
IX’ w/100 ‘reverse gender discrimination’” (resulting in one case), (5) “adv:  
‘erroneous outcome’ w/100 ‘Yusuf’” (resulting in twenty-nine cases), and (6) 
“adv:  ‘Title IX’ and ‘discrimination’ w/5 ‘sex’ and ‘Yusuf’ and ‘Twombly’” 
(resulting in thirty cases).  The cases returned from each search significantly 
overlapped. 
Additionally, I restricted the searches to only those cases resolving 
motions to dismiss; this means cases involving preliminary injunctions were 
not considered.  Further, I excluded cases that were vacated or reversed.  
Finally, after narrowing the searches in accordance with the criteria above, I 
read and analyzed each case focusing on the court’s position regarding 
dismissal for gender discrimination.  In total, twenty-eight cases satisfied 
these criteria, spanning twenty-two district courts and one circuit court.219  
The following subsections detail the results of this empirical analysis along 
with the common arguments espoused for each position. 
 
 219. The districts that have considered reverse Title IX claims include the Southern District 
of Ohio, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern District of Tennessee, Southern District of New 
York, Northern District of New York, Western District of New York, Eastern District of 
Michigan, District of Colorado, District of Massachusetts, Eastern District of Virginia, 
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2.  The Majority of Courts Dismiss 
Reverse Title IX Lawsuits 
Without question, most post-Iqbal courts dismiss reverse Title IX claims 
for causal insufficiency.220  Twenty out of the twenty-eight cases (71 percent) 
dismissed erroneous outcome and selective enforcement claims for failure to 
adequately allege causation.221  These courts held that inferences of 
discriminatory bias were insufficient to link erroneous disciplinary 
proceedings with the male student’s gender. 
In 2015, for example, the Southern District of New York dismissed Xiaolu 
Peter Yu’s Title IX claim against Vassar College because Yu’s complaint did 
not contain allegations of discriminatory statements or actions showing the 
influence of gender in the disciplinary process.222  Yu simply stated that 
“males invariably lose” their disciplinary proceedings for sexual assault 
cases, but he did not point to any statistical evidence to support this 
conclusion.223  The court found Yu’s complaint insufficient on this count and 
dismissed both Yu’s erroneous outcome claim and his selective enforcement 
action.224  Similarly, the Southern District of Ohio dismissed without 
prejudice an accused student’s erroneous outcome claim because the 
complaint 
lack[ed] allegations that Miami University had a pattern of decisionmaking 
based on gender, that Miami University officials or disciplinary board 
members made comments demonstrating gender-based animus, or that the 
disciplinary proceedings against [the complainant] arose in the context of 
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 224. See id. at 475–81. 
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an OCR investigation against Miami University for its handling of sexual 
assault charges.225 
The accused student’s assertion that the university’s disciplinary action 
occurred because of his sex was purely conclusory and, therefore, not entitled 
to a presumption of truth.  This court reached an identical conclusion in 
Marshall v. Ohio University,226 when it noted that “[a] mere pattern and 
practice of treating men and women differently does not reflect the reasons 
for differential treatment.”227  Unless the accused student can point to 
specific factual evidence that the differential treatment occurred because of 
the student’s gender, the complaint fails the plausibility test.228  The Northern 
District of Ohio enforced parallel reasoning in Doe v. Case Western Reserve 
University,229 where it remarked that allegations of deficient or erroneous 
disciplinary hearings do not constitute evidence of discriminatory bias.230  
Rather, the accused student must plead facts supporting intentional 
discriminatory animus.231 
Similarly, the District of Massachusetts held that where a university’s code 
of conduct is facially neutral and the university has received no complaints 
by male students against female students for sexual violence, gender 
discrimination is implausible.232  The accused student in that case failed to 
disclose factual evidence to support his statement that males accused of 
sexual misconduct are inevitably found responsible for the harassment.233  
The Southern District of Ohio extrapolated on the District of Massachusetts’s 
reasoning in March 2016 when it explained that statistical evidence showing 
that only males are investigated and disciplined for sexual misconduct is 
insufficient to support a gender bias claim.234  Instead, two nondiscriminatory 
reasons for this statistical disparity exist:  (1) universities only receive 
complaints of male-on-female sexual violence and (2) males are less likely 
than females to report incidents of sexual misconduct.235  These innocent 
explanations preclude a plausible finding of gender discrimination. 
The Western District of Missouri articulated a comparable argument when 
an accused student failed to identify any similarly situated female perpetrator 
who received more favorable treatment during a disciplinary proceeding.236  
In particular, the court noted that even if a female student receives 
preferential treatment during the campus disciplinary process, that favorable 
interaction does not suggest sex discrimination.237  Rather, the discrepancy 
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in experiences may result from the individual nature of each case, innocent 
circumstances, or other nondiscriminatory explanations.  According to the 
Southern District of Ohio and District of Massachusetts, the favorable 
treatment a victim receives during the disciplinary process at most evinces 
bias against perpetrators, not gender discrimination.238  The Central District 
of Illinois, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern District of Michigan, District 
of South Dakota, Eastern District of Virginia, District of Colorado, Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, Western District of New York, District of New 
Jersey, and Eastern District of Tennessee have similarly questioned the 
causal link between disciplinary errors and gender bias and opted to dismiss 
reverse discrimination claims as being insufficiently pled.239  Thus, the 
majority of courts refuse to entertain reverse Title IX claims premised solely 
on allegations of flawed disciplinary procedures or severe sanctions when 
there is no corresponding evidence to suggest discriminatory animus. 
3.  A Minority of Courts Permit Reverse Title IX Claims 
to Proceed to Discovery 
Contrary to the prodismissal approach espoused by the judicial majority, a 
minority of courts allow reverse Title IX claims to proceed to discovery on 
the basis of plausible discrimination.  Of the cases examined, only eight (29 
percent) permitted reverse Title IX lawsuits to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss.240  While a facial review suggests that the minority position is 
severely disfavored, the Second Circuit recently adopted this approach in 
July 2016, which could influence future judicial precedents nationwide.241  
Thus, the minority position may eventually outpace the prodismissal 
perspective. 
The minority’s interpretation of reverse Title IX claims began in 2014 and 
became increasingly prevalent in 2015 and 2016.  Courts that take the 
minority position have different views regarding the precise facts that support 
gender discrimination, but they share the view that male perpetrators are 
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improperly denied access to discovery.242  In particular, the minority cautions 
against imposing evidentiary standards at the motion to dismiss stage and 
reminds courts to examine whether the factual inferences support 
discrimination.  For example, in Wells v. Xavier University,243 the Southern 
District of Ohio took all inferences in favor of the male plaintiff and 
determined that the plaintiff’s contentions that Xavier had a practice of 
discriminatory decision making was sufficient to withstand dismissal.244  
Comparable reasoning was adopted in Ritter v. Oklahoma City University,245 
when the district court acknowledged that the issue of gender discrimination 
was “a close question” but found sufficient facts to cast doubt on the accuracy 
of the proceeding.246 
The most recent and compelling case supporting the minority’s position is 
the Second Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Columbia University.247  Decided on 
July 29, 2016, this case evaluates the application of plausibility pleading to 
reverse Title IX claims.  Specifically, the Second Circuit explained that an 
allegation of sex discrimination coupled with “specific facts that support a 
minimal plausible inference” of discrimination satisfies Twombly and 
Iqbal.248  As applied to Title IX claims, the court held that allegations of 
disciplinary errors combined with assertions that the university was subject 
to intense criticism by the student body and media for not taking sexual 
assault complaints seriously gave rise to a plausible inference of gender 
bias.249  This criticism was so pervasive that the university president even 
called a university-wide meeting with the dean to discuss the issue.  Thus, 
given this factual background, “it is entirely plausible that the University’s 
decision-makers and its investigator were motivated to favor the accusing 
female over the accused male, so as to protect themselves and the University 
from accusations that they had failed to protect female students from sexual 
assault.”250  In arriving at this holding, the Second Circuit reversed the 
district court’s finding of insufficient causal evidence. 
Similarly, in Doe v. Brown University,251 the District of Rhode Island 
denied a motion to dismiss a reverse Title IX claim.252  The court provided a 
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detailed analysis of the judicial split in Title IX cases and concluded that 
mandating statistical evidence, discriminatory statements, or other data at the 
motion to dismiss stage was erroneous and premature.  According to the 
court, “Requiring that a male student conclusively demonstrate, at the 
pleading stage, with statistical evidence and/or data analysis that female 
students accused of sexual assault were treated differently, is both practically 
impossible and inconsistent with the standard used in other discrimination 
contexts.”253  The court cautioned its judicial counterparts against converting 
the standard for a motion to dismiss into one for quasi summary judgment.254  
Where there are allegations that a university’s actions against an accused 
student were unjust and motivated by a desire to “crack down” on sexual 
assault, the truth of those statements cannot be resolved at the motion to 
dismiss stage.255  The fact that these allegations may be pled upon 
information and belief does not make them improper.256 
The ability to plead discrimination upon information and belief is further 
supported by the District of Maryland’s analysis in Doe v. Salisbury 
University.257  In Salisbury, the court denied a motion to dismiss where the 
accused student alleged, on information and belief, that the college possessed 
documentary evidence demonstrating an intentional bias toward female 
victims over male assailants.258  The court determined that the plaintiff’s 
allegations of potential evidence, if true, could showcase gender as a 
motivating factor behind the flawed disciplinary proceedings.259  While the 
court cautioned that “victim/perpetrator discrimination” does not qualify as 
gender discrimination,260 it accepted these allegations as true in accordance 
with Twombly and Iqbal.  The court treated the plaintiff’s information and 
belief allegations regarding a speculative document as factual statements 
entitled to a presumption of truth. 
Finally, the Western District of Virginia struck a middle ground between 
the majority and minority positions when it denied a university’s motion to 
dismiss a reverse Title IX claim on the basis that the accused student pled 
sufficient factual allegations to establish a causal connection between the 
discrimination and gender.  In Doe v. Washington & Lee University,261 the 
accused student alleged that his disciplinary “investigation and hearing 
occurred in an environment that created pressure for the university to punish 
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male students for sexual misconduct.”262  In support of this conclusion, the 
plaintiff cited a letter Washington & Lee published announcing the 
appointment of a Title IX officer and stating that numerous universities are 
under investigation for violating Title IX.263  The complaint further 
referenced a May 1, 2014 press release from OCR, which remarked that 
universities could lose federal funding for failing to comply with Title IX, 
and a Rolling Stone article that described the University of Virginia as 
unresponsive to campus sexual assault.264  These documents, according to 
the plaintiff, sufficiently demonstrated that Washington & Lee discriminated 
against male assailants to avoid backlash by OCR.265  Most critically, 
however, the plaintiff pointed to an October 5, 2014 presentation by Lauren 
Kozak in which the Title IX officer endorsed the notion that a sexual assault 
occurs if a female later regrets the sexual encounter but did not express any 
outward reservations.266  The court found this presentation especially 
relevant “because of the parallels of the situation it describes and the 
circumstances under which Plaintiff was found responsible for sexual 
misconduct.”267  Additionally, given that Kozak wielded considerable 
influence over the disciplinary proceedings, her statements deserved 
scrutiny.268  Thus, because the accused student cited in his complaint specific 
discriminatory statements, documents, and presentations, the court 
appropriately denied Washington & Lee’s motion to dismiss the Title IX 
count. 
D.  The Two Ways to Establish Causality 
Under the Majority’s Pleading Framework 
Pleading reverse Title IX lawsuits is daunting at first glance given the high 
dismissal rate that plagues these claims.  Accused students frequently cite 
Title IX as an avenue for relief, but recovery under this theory is rare and 
limited.  Although these claims face routine dismissal, the dismissals occur 
because of purportedly insufficient allegations of causal links between the 
erroneous disciplinary proceedings and gender bias.  According to the 
majority of courts, accused students have not plausibly demonstrated that 
flaws in the investigatory and adjudicatory processes are the result of sex 
discrimination rather than victim favoritism and perpetrator bias.  Merely 
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providing general background history on OCR’s actions and a conclusory 
statement about the impact of the 2011 DCL do not constitute factual support 
for a claim.  Regardless of whether the majority’s approach is proper, reverse 
Title IX complaints must adopt one of two pleading frameworks to survive 
dismissal:  (1) description of particular discriminatory statements, 
presentations, or actions by the university or (2) identification of a similarly 
situated female sexual assault perpetrator who received more favorable 
treatment during the disciplinary process.  If accused students can enhance 
their factual accusations on this causal element, then reverse Title IX claims 
will likely progress into the critical discovery phase. 
It is undeniable that if a plaintiff alleges particular conduct by the 
defendant (e.g., presentations, publications, and dialogue) that can be 
interpreted as discriminatory, then the causal element is adequately pled.269  
As illustrated in Washington & Lee, the plaintiff’s reverse Title IX claim 
survived not because of the generalized discussion regarding the 2011 DCL 
or the Rolling Stone article but because of the plaintiff’s reference to an 
October 5, 2014 presentation by the Title IX officer.270  During that 
presentation, the Title IX officer inaccurately defined rape as including all 
sexual encounters that a female student later regrets.271  Because the Title IX 
officer was centrally involved in the accused student’s investigatory and 
adjudicatory proceedings, her statements plausibly evidenced discriminatory 
bias. 
In accordance with the Washington & Lee holding, accused students 
should identify with particularity any statements, presentations, publications, 
conversations, actions, or training materials published or used by members 
of the university’s investigatory and adjudicatory teams that could 
demonstrate discrimination.  Allegations of this nature support 
discriminatory bias at a specific university and help distinguish a plaintiff’s 
case from general reverse Title IX actions.  If possible, the statements or 
conduct in question should come from a university member directly involved 
in the plaintiff’s case.  Additionally, a plaintiff’s argument is strengthened if 
the language used in the code of conduct or other disciplinary documents is 
not gender neutral.272  Plaintiffs alleging these facts have a strong likelihood 
of reaching discovery on Title IX claims. 
The second path to discovery is to pinpoint specific instances in which 
accused female sexual assault perpetrators have received favorable treatment 
compared to accused male sexual assault assailants.273  Civil rights cases 
demonstrate that merely alleging different treatment of a similarly situated 
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counterpart is insufficient and conclusory.274  Rather, the plaintiff must (1) 
identify the comparable person by name, title, or other definitive 
characteristic, (2) show that her circumstances are similar to the plaintiff’s, 
and (3) specify the preferential treatment.  Plaintiffs who are able to identify 
female sexual assault perpetrators and show that they received more lenient 
punishments could easily sustain their Title IX claims under this pleading 
structure. 
While this framework would propel a reverse Title IX action into 
discovery, it faces practical limitations that restrict its usefulness.  Given that 
men perpetrate the majority of known campus sexual violence, it is nearly 
impossible to locate a female who has been accused of sexual misconduct.275  
Without a corresponding female perpetrator, how can a male support his 
accusation that he received unfavorable treatment based on his gender?  To 
date, male perpetrators have attempted to plead around this issue in one of 
two ways.  First, males claim that the female victim received more favorable 
treatment and guidance during the disciplinary process.276  Second, plaintiffs 
may cite instances of nonsexual disciplinary proceedings (e.g., academic 
cheating) in which females were not punished with suspension or expulsion. 
Unfortunately, neither of these pleading strategies can support 
discriminatory animus under the majority’s pleading scheme.  The first 
scenario demonstrates only victim/perpetrator discrimination, not gender 
discrimination.  Because the victim could be either male or female, the fact 
that the victim received more attention and assistance throughout the 
disciplinary process does not support sex discrimination.277  
Victim/perpetrator discrimination is not an actionable form of discrimination 
under Title IX.278  Additionally, that females may have received lesser 
sanctions for nonsexual code of conduct violations is irrelevant.  To qualify 
as similarly situated individuals, the female and male students must have 
comparable disciplinary allegations—i.e., sexual misconduct.  Clearly, the 
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victim of a sexual assault is not similarly situated to the perpetrator of the 
attack.  Therefore, although reverse Title IX complaints often contain pages 
of allegations suggesting that a female victim received favorable treatment or 
a female nonsexual assault perpetrator enjoyed a more lenient punishment, 
these declarations do little to demonstrate plausible causality. 
Moreover, a plaintiff cannot use a sexual harassment claim filed against a 
female teacher or administrator to support his allegations.  The plaintiff and 
the favorably treated counterpart must be equivalently positioned to warrant 
comparison.  In Grant v. Communications Workers of America, Local 
1101,279 the Southern District of New York dismissed a racial discrimination 
count where the plaintiff, a black male, claimed his grievance was treated 
differently than that of the local vice president, a white male.280  The local 
vice president, however, was not similarly situated to the plaintiff in all 
material respects.  Specifically, the vice president was a manager in the 
company, and the claims against him were of a different nature than the 
claims against the plaintiff.281  Just as a typical employee and vice president 
are not similarly situated,282 a teacher and a student are not comparable 
counterparts.  While the similarly situated assailant framework would 
progress a reverse gender discrimination claim to discovery, it must be 
appropriately pleaded and is only available to those plaintiffs who can 
identify female perpetrators of sexual violence on campus.  Thus, plaintiffs 
may access the holy grail of discovery by either alleging direct evidence of 
discrimination (i.e., referencing discriminatory statements or conduct by 
university officials) or using circumstantial evidence (i.e., identifying a 
similarly situated female perpetrator).  Given that most schools do not receive 
sexual assault complaints involving female assailants, reverse Title IX claims 
may be an exception to the widely held belief that circumstantial evidence of 
discrimination is easier to allege than direct discrimination.283 
Title IX claims that adhere to this rigid pleading structure are almost 
guaranteed to survive the inevitable motion to dismiss.  These claims not only 
factually describe the causal connection between improper conduct and 
discrimination but also highlight supporting evidence to back these 
assertions.  This pleading framework, however, imposes an impossible 
burden on plaintiffs to identify evidence without discovery.  When plaintiffs 
fail to meet this standard on the issue of causality—even though the 
complaint as a whole states an otherwise plausible claim—courts quickly 
grant dismissal motions without considering the insurmountable hurdle they 
have erected.  While the denial of perpetrators’ rights at the university level 
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is egregious, it is the imposition of unwarranted procedural obstacles that is 
the greater miscarriage of justice. 
IV.  SOLVING THE PLAUSIBILITY AND CATCH-22 PROBLEMS 
FOR REVERSE TITLE IX CLAIMS 
Judicial interpretation of plausibility pleading as applied to Title IX claims 
has created an outcome fundamentally at odds with the principles of 
Swierkiewicz.284  As explained by the Supreme Court, a prima facie case of 
discrimination need not be established at the pleading stage.285  Yet, despite 
this mandate, a majority of courts require evidence of discriminatory bias at 
the outset of the lawsuit.286  Not only does this requirement contravene 
Swierkiewicz, but it also enhances the catch-22 trap.  Reverse Title IX actions 
suffer from an inherent gender disparity:  males commit the majority of 
known sexual assaults.  This gender imbalance is inherent to sexual assault 
claims, yet courts still require accused male perpetrators to identify similarly 
situated female assailants to prove gender discrimination.  Such a standard is 
impossible to satisfy and eliminates Title IX as an avenue for recovery.  This 
part explains how the majority’s approach to reverse Title IX claims conflicts 
with Swierkiewicz, and it proposes a flexible pleading structure that satisfies 
Twombly, Iqbal, and Swierkiewicz. 
A.  The Majority’s Pleading Scheme 
Contravenes Swierkiewicz 
In Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court emphasized that civil rights plaintiffs 
need not establish a prima facie case of discrimination at the pleading stage; 
rather, a prima facie case is an evidentiary burden applicable at summary 
judgment.287  The creation of a prima facie case refers directly to the 
plaintiff’s “burden of presenting evidence that raises an inference of 
discrimination.”288  Because the prima facie case is a flexible evidentiary 
standard, discovery is typically necessary before the precise elements of 
discrimination can be adequately established.289  When courts require a prima 
facie case of discrimination at the pleading stage, they transpose a soft 
evidentiary requirement into a rigid pleading framework.290  The result is an 
insurmountable pleading hurdle for plaintiffs and the creation of a catch-22 
scenario. 
Courts have become hyperfocused on ensuring plausibility through 
evidentiary statements and, in so doing, have misconstrued the plausibility 
requirements.  The majority’s approach to reverse Title IX actions is to 
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dismiss the claim unless a plaintiff cites specific discriminatory statements 
or actions by the defendant or identifies a female sexual assault perpetrator 
whose disciplinary experience was more favorable than that of the plaintiff.  
These “facts,” however, are more akin to evidence, which is not required until 
the summary judgment stage.291  Furthermore, this evidence is likely in the 
possession of the defendant, not the plaintiff, and cannot realistically be 
acquired without discovery.  Rather than viewing an assertion of sex 
discrimination as factual when combined with the complaint’s additional 
allegations, courts mandate proof of causality at the dismissal stage.  This 
approach is improper because the causal link between the defendant’s 
conduct and gender discrimination is a prima facie element.292 
While “the elements of a prima facie case may be used as a prism to shed 
light upon the plausibility of a claim,” a plaintiff need not plead specific facts 
to establish each element of discrimination.293  Rather, the proper approach 
is to assess the complaint as a whole.  The relevant question should not 
concern whether the plaintiff supported a causal statement with detailed 
evidence but instead whether the complaint renders a plaintiff’s entitlement 
to relief plausible.294  A complaint that factually details the wrongful conduct 
and includes an allegation that the defendant’s acts were “because of” the 
plaintiff’s gender states a plausible claim for relief.  Such allegations provide 
sufficient notice to the defendant of the claim and raise the right to recovery 
above the speculative level.  The causation element does not need additional 
factual support to comply with Swierkiewicz and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8.  The majority’s routine dismissal of reverse Title IX actions 
unaccompanied by evidentiary data or statistics is a misapplication of 
pleading precedent.  This misapplication bars the doors to recovery for 
reverse Title IX claims that are adequately pleaded in compliance with 
Twombly and Swierkiewicz.  Thus, the majority’s approach to reverse Title 
IX claims is misguided and unlawfully precludes plaintiffs from accessing 
judicial remedies. 
B.  An Appropriate Pleading Framework 
for Reverse Title IX Claims 
To repair the dysfunctional lens through which courts view reverse Title 
IX complaints, a new pleading scheme must be implemented for the causal 
element.  This revised pleading approach does not violate the holdings of 
Twombly and Iqbal but rather ensures compatibility between these cases and 
Swierkiewicz.  Pleading under this new framework promotes flexibility for 
courts to consider the sexual assault gender imbalance.  It is important to note 
 
 291. See Doe v. Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d 177, 188 (D.R.I. 2016) (explaining that “the 
type of evidence called for by the Columbia court,” that is, data showing that women are rarely 
accused of sexual harassment, combined with evidence that women accused of other conduct 
violations are treated differently than men “is more akin to what would be required at summary 
judgment”). 
 292. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 293. See Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 294. See id. at 55. 
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that this proposed framework applies solely to the causal link between the 
flawed disciplinary proceeding and discrimination.  It does not impact the 
pleading standard for additional Title IX elements. 
Few scholars would disagree that the causal connection between 
inappropriate conduct and discriminatory animus is the most difficult part of 
pleading civil rights cases.295  That said, pleading causation should not be as 
difficult as courts demand.  To successfully establish a causal link between a 
flawed disciplinary proceeding and sex discrimination, a plaintiff should be 
required only to allege two elements:  (1) the unfavorable outcome occurred 
because of the plaintiff’s gender and (2) limited, generalized circumstances 
that give rise to an inference of bias.  Each factor is discussed in turn below. 
First, the allegation that a university engaged in erroneous disciplinary 
conduct because of an accused student’s gender should be sufficient in and 
of itself to create an inference of discrimination.296  Given that a prima facie 
case is unnecessary at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff need not 
articulate statistical or evidentiary data supporting this assertion in his 
complaint so long as the defendant has notice of the basis of the claim.297  
The mere allegation of causation combined with the plaintiff’s factual 
recitation of harm nudges the complaint across the plausibility threshold.  
Some reverse Title IX courts even admit that such a causal statement is 
sufficient in the context of general civil rights cases.298 
Yet, despite this acknowledgement, the majority of judges inappropriately 
require evidentiary support for reverse Title IX complaints.  The flaw in this 
reasoning is that simple causal allegations include both conclusory and 
factual underpinnings.299  A statement that the university treated a male 
assailant unfavorably because of his gender cannot be deemed either 
conclusory or factual—it is an inseparable mix.  Therefore, a “because of” 
allegation should rightfully be read as factual and assumed true during a 
motion to dismiss stage. 
Nonetheless, given the reluctance of courts to accept a single allegation of 
causality as sufficient, plaintiffs should incorporate a second prong into their 
pleading framework.  Plaintiffs should include one or two generalized 
factual—not detailed or specific—circumstances that could support 
discriminatory motive.  These corroborative facts could include any of the 
following. 
First, a plaintiff can allege that the university more harshly punishes male 
sexual assault perpetrators than female perpetrators of other crimes.  This 
statement is most effective when accompanied by a follow-up explanation of 
 
 295. See Seiner, supra note 283, at 1046. 
 296. See Waters v. Drake, 105 F. Supp. 3d 780, 804 (S.D. Ohio 2015); Wells v. Xavier 
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the gender disparity for sexual assault cases.  No statistics or data are 
necessary at the pleading stage to enhance this allegation, though a plaintiff 
should feel free to include such evidence if it is available. 
Second, a plaintiff can allege that the disciplinary errors and imposition of 
an improper sanction were the result of increased OCR pressure on the 
university to crack down on sexual assault or lose federal funding.  A plaintiff 
could identify statements by OCR or policies in the 2011 DCL that altered 
the Title IX landscape and could further discuss the vast increase in OCR 
investigations over the last few years. 
Third, a plaintiff could identify changes in the university’s sexual assault 
policies post-2011 and articulate that similar changes were not imposed for 
nonsex crimes.  This allegation should be accompanied by a brief explanation 
of how OCR and the 2011 DCL altered the university’s approach to Title IX. 
Fourth, if the majority of university investigators and hearing panelists are 
female, the accused student could argue implicit and outgroup bias premised 
on his gender.300  A similar argument is viable if an investigator or panelist 
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previously experienced sexual violence.  Inclusion of a sentence explaining 
the gender disparity for sexual assault cases would also benefit this category. 
Fifth, if a university uses clear and convincing evidence as the standard of 
proof for nonsexual code violations, a plaintiff could contrast that higher 
evidentiary standard with the preponderance of the evidence standard used 
for sexual misconduct claims. 
The above examples are not exclusive but offer an illustration of limited 
factual statements that can accompany an otherwise sufficient allegation of 
causality.  While these factual circumstances have tenable nondiscriminatory 
explanations, they also support an inference of plausible discriminatory bias 
at the dismissal stage.  Unlike the pleading standards required by a majority 
of courts, the facts in this framework are generalized and easily attainable 
without discovery.  When combined with the particularized allegations of 
wrongdoing and harm, the causal link sufficiently establishes plausibility and 
gives a defendant notice of the claim. 
When a court assumes these proposed facts are true, the causal connection 
between improper motive and erroneous conduct satisfies Twombly and 
Iqbal.  The Southern District of Ohio recognized the appropriateness of this 
pleading structure in Wells v. Xavier University.301  In Wells, the court held 
that the defendant’s allegation that the university discriminated against him 
to prove its commitment to OCR’s sexual assault policies was sufficient to 
withstand a motion to dismiss.302  The court did not require additional 
evidentiary support for this statement and reserved the issue of proof for 
summary judgment.303  Judges that require plaintiffs to further support 
similar accusations with discriminatory statements or statistics misinterpret 
plausibility pleading and the judiciary’s role in resolving a motion to 
dismiss.304  Thus, by returning the causal hurdle to its appropriate position, 
plaintiffs can more easily establish the elements of a reverse Title IX claim.  
In addition to conforming with plausibility requirements, this standard is 
uniquely flexible to account for the gender disparity that accompanies sexual 
assault crimes. 
Courts that resist this pleading approach may argue that the limited 
circumstances described above support only disparate impact discrimination, 
not discriminatory motivation.  While it is possible that these events 
constitute disparate impact, discriminatory animus is an equally likely 
conclusion when viewed in conjunction with the low reporting rates for 
female perpetrators.  Explanations of the current climate of sexual assault are 
further helpful in informing a judge’s common sense.  As the Iqbal Court 
explained, judges may rely on their experiences and common sense to 
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influence their judgments of plausibility.305  A judge is not restricted to the 
four corners of a complaint, and the pleading stage is too early for courts to 
preclude discriminatory animus.  Although disparate impact may be more 
probable, discriminatory intent is nonetheless plausible.  Because the 
pleading standard is plausibility not probability, reverse Title IX claims that 
adhere to this pleading framework should proceed to discovery. 
C.  Using Limited Discovery to Reduce Litigation Costs 
and Avoid a Catch-22 Scenario 
The main drawback of flexible pleading for reverse Title IX actions is the 
economic cost universities endure in defending against these lawsuits.  
Discovery expenses typically make up half of the total costs of litigation and 
can be financially debilitating.306  The solution, however, is not to implement 
a pleading standard that is impossible to satisfy.  Rather, courts should allow 
limited discovery on the causality element before ruling on a motion to 
dismiss.  This limited discovery further avoids the possibility that plaintiffs 
will be caught in a catch-22 and have their claims judged on informational 
asymmetry rather than the merits. 
The vast majority of reverse Title IX lawsuits do not suffer from 
informational deficiencies on the first part of an erroneous outcome claim—
i.e., the flaws during the disciplinary proceeding that resulted in an 
inappropriate sanction.  Rather, these circumstances are extremely well 
pleaded throughout the complaint, and cases are rarely dismissed on this 
ground.  The greater catch-22 problem lies with the causal link to 
discriminatory bias.  The two-part pleading standard advocated above 
maintains that this causal element is adequately pled by including a “because 
of” statement accompanied by one or two limited factual circumstances that 
could give rise to an inference of bias.  This standard does not require the 
plaintiff to describe particular discriminatory statements by the university or 
to identify a similarly situated individual of the opposite sex who received 
favorable treatment.  The problem, however, is that altering an established 
pleading regime—even one that is improperly interpreted and misapplied—
does not occur overnight.  Courts may be reluctant to advance reverse Title 
IX claims to discovery due to the associated economic costs.  For courts that 
still harbor doubts about the sufficiency of the causal element, limited 
discovery should be permitted before conclusively ruling on a motion to 
dismiss. 
The use of limited discovery to support plausibility is not novel307 but has 
rarely been applied in the reverse Title IX context.  Courts reviewing civil 
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rights cases are increasingly permitting parties to take targeted discovery 
before determining that a plaintiff’s claims are implausible.308  The use of 
restricted early stage discovery for Title IX cases should focus on the causal 
element to determine whether discrimination is a plausible explanation for 
the university’s conduct.  Engaging in early discovery on this element 
reduces the likelihood that a catch-22 will materialize, while simultaneously 
limiting a defendant’s exposure to discovery costs if discrimination is not a 
viable theory.309  Furthermore, authorizing limited discovery is relatively risk 
free for the court:  a judge has discretion to approve early stage discovery 
requests, and use of this discretion is largely unreviewable.310  An order 
permitting targeted discovery will not subject the court to appellate review, 
ensures that plaintiffs can access discriminatory data solely in the defendant’s 
possession, and reduces long-term discovery costs if discrimination is not 
plausible.  Where material evidence of discrimination is likely to be within 
the defendant’s control, courts should afford plaintiffs latitude in pleading 
the affected elements and grant access to discovery.311  For these reasons, 
courts should permit discovery on the causal connection between 
wrongdoing and discrimination prior to dismissing the action, particularly if 
the proposed two-prong pleading framework recommended above has been 
satisfied. 
It is conceivable that courts will nonetheless resist the use of predismissal 
discovery on the basis that the economic costs still unfairly burden the 
defendant if a claim is not viable.  In many instances, the nature of the causal 
discovery can be accomplished with little or no burden to the university.312  
Nonetheless, to resolve this concern, plaintiffs could be responsible for 
paying the costs of any preliminary discovery that a court contends is 
necessary to determine plausibility.313  While shifting this economic burden 
may be disfavored by plaintiffs, it is a small price to ensure the viability of 
reverse Title IX claims. 
D.  Why the New Pleading Framework Matters 
Reverse Title IX actions do not provide plaintiffs with meaningful 
monetary recovery, especially given the unavailability of punitive 
damages.314  Indeed, the current pleading climate suggests that due process 
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and breach of contract actions, which are often brought alongside reverse 
Title XI actions, are easier to plead and thus more likely to proceed to 
discovery.  Why, then, do plaintiffs insist on asserting reverse sex 
discrimination claims? 
The driving force behind reverse Title IX actions is the desire to proclaim 
political outrage at the extent to which OCR has manipulated the educational 
disciplinary framework.  OCR’s hyperfocus on victim rights has created an 
environment in which universities are pressured to support OCR’s sexual 
assault agenda instead of promoting due process.  It is easier and more 
economically rewarding for universities to comply with OCR guidelines and 
convict male assailants than to fight for the rights of those that are accused.  
With Title IX lawsuits, accused students seek to swing the sexual assault 
pendulum back to a sturdy midpoint that balances the interests of both victim 
and perpetrator.  Alleged perpetrators seek judicial declarations that their 
rights matter and further wish to hold OCR accountable for violating these 
rights.  Reverse Title IX lawsuits are generally not about money.  They are a 
public statement that the agency responsible for prohibiting sex 
discrimination in educational institutions has created a hostile environment 
for accused perpetrators based on gender.  Because OCR failed to equally 
protect male students, alleged perpetrators have no choice but to seek judicial 
relief. 
While the erosion of legal rights by OCR is fundamentally problematic, 
the narrower legal issue of causal pleading is more detrimental to plaintiffs.  
The majority’s pleading framework denies accused perpetrators their final 
chance to protect their liberty and property interests and eliminates any relief 
from OCR’s overreaching.  This heightened pleading standard has triggered 
“intense societal controversy over the judicial system’s accessibility.”315  The 
implementation of a new causal pleading scheme is thus necessary to ensure 
accused perpetrators receive their day in court.  Without this flexible pleading 
standard, accused perpetrators will continue to be systematically denied 
access to the courthouse through a basic misunderstanding of plausibility 
requirements.  Denying alleged assailants even the potential for judicial relief 
is a fundamental breach of justice. 
Additionally, the proposed causal framework ensures consistency among 
pleading standards in civil rights cases.  Title IX is not the first civil rights 
statute to be negatively impacted by Twombly and Iqbal.  Rather, the 
unfavorable effects of heightened pleading are well documented in the 
employment discrimination context under Title VII.316  Similar to the 
majority’s pleading approach to Title IX cases, courts analyzing Title VII 
actions routinely require plaintiffs to plead a prima facie case of 
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discrimination.  Scholars have criticized this position as a misinterpretation 
of Twombly and Iqbal and have advocated for the adoption of new structures 
that either lessen the plaintiffs’ pleading burdens or ensure plaintiffs have 
meaningful but limited access to predismissal discovery. 
For example, Professor Joseph Seiner proposed a five-part pleading 
framework for Title VII plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination.  To 
successfully plead employment discrimination, a plaintiff must simply 
identify (1) the victim; (2) the protected characteristic; (3) the nature of the 
discrimination suffered, including the specific harm or adverse action; (4) the 
date and time of the discrimination; and (5) the causal link.317  This 
recommended framework is in line with academic scholarship on post-
Twombly pleading requirements for civil rights cases.318  With regard to 
establishing the causal link, Professor Seiner notes that a plaintiff need only 
indicate that the adverse action was taken by the defendant against the 
plaintiff because of her membership in a protected class.319  This basic causal 
allegation mirrors the first part of the recommended reverse Title IX pleading 
framework and establishes consistency between the pleading proposals for 
Title VII and Title IX claims. 
Furthermore, the implementation of uniform pleading standards for civil 
rights cases saves resources and avoids dismissals based on the biases and 
temperament of individual judges.  As demonstrated in Part III.C, courts have 
been inconsistent in their analysis of reverse Title IX complaints, leaving 
plaintiffs with substantial uncertainty about how to plead their claims.  
Plaintiffs are unable to account for the individual perceptions and worldviews 
of each judge and are unfairly subject to the whims of the court.  A consistent 
pleading framework helps define the parameters of plausibility and promotes 
uniformity among courts.  This uniformity may also reduce litigation costs 
because “plaintiffs would not be required to engage in extensive pleadings 
and defendants would not have to respond to lengthy complaints.”320  
Presently, most reverse Title IX complaints are more than fifty pages in 
length.321  Thus, a more flexible and predictable pleading standard could 
enhance efficiency at the beginning of the lawsuit and is necessary to ensure 
access to justice. 
CONCLUSION 
The climate of Title IX sexual assault litigation is changing.  Previously 
viewed as a victim protection statute, Title IX is increasingly being invoked 
by accused perpetrators of sexual violence to demand fair and equitable 
disciplinary proceedings.  This influx of reverse Title IX litigation comes on 
the heels of OCR’s updated sexual assault guidelines.  The 2011 DCL forced 
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universities to lower the standard of proof for sexual misconduct cases and 
mandated adoption of decidedly provictim policies.  While this provictim 
stance sought to eliminate educational indifference to sexual assault, it 
neglected to protect the basic due process rights of accused perpetrators.  By 
threatening to withdraw federal funding for noncompliance, OCR 
unwittingly created a discriminatory environment against alleged male 
perpetrators.  Accused assailants frequently endure skewed investigatory and 
adjudicatory processes that lack basic truth-seeking structures.  In this 
manner, OCR has sacrificed fairness and due process to support its policy 
agenda.  As a result, males claim that they are invariably found guilty of 
sexual violence. 
Unfortunately for accused students, the doors of justice have not only been 
shut by OCR and universities, but they have also been locked by district 
courts.  Accused students seeking vindication of their rights are routinely 
turned away from the courthouse at the motion to dismiss stage.  The 
empirical analysis illustrates that the majority of courts apply an 
inappropriately high pleading standard that results in dismissal of almost all 
reverse Title IX actions.  Rather than viewing complaints as a whole and 
recognizing that a “because of” causal statement is both factual and legal, 
courts improperly require plaintiffs to showcase evidence of discrimination 
at the outset of the lawsuit.  This hurdle is impossible to satisfy at the pleading 
stage and results in an unfortunate catch-22 scenario. 
To remedy this flawed pleading structure, a flexible causal standard must 
be implemented that complies with Twombly, Iqbal, and Swierkiewicz.  This 
new pleading regime encompasses two elements:  (1) a simple causal 
allegation that the sex discrimination occurred because of the accused 
perpetrator’s gender and (2) limited factual circumstances that support a 
general finding of bias.  The second prong does not require detailed factual 
or evidentiary support; rather, allegations of implicit bias, general university 
or public policy shifts towards provictim procedures, and disciplinary 
irregularities compared with nonsexual misconduct violations are sufficient.  
By altering the causal pleading framework in this manner, courts ensure that 
reverse Title IX complaints can ride the wave to discovery instead of 
drowning for insufficient evidence. 
